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A NUMERUS CLAUSUS PRINCIPLE FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CHRISTINA MULLIGAN*

Real property can only be held and conveyed in a small number of
forms, such as fee simple, life estate, and lease. This principle is known as
numerus clausus, meaning "the number is closed." For centuries, the
principle has been central to the common-law system of property rights.
Scholars have justified it as a mechanism for facilitating effective property
alienation, maintaining low transaction costs in the buying and selling of
property, and keeping the scope of property owners' rights clear.
In contrast, the numerus clausus principle is essentially nonexistent in
intellectual property law. In the context of patents and copyrights, "the
number is open." There is nearly no limit to the ways in which intellectual
objects can be licensed and sold.
This Article will argue that the numerus clausus principle should extend
to intellectual property. The justifications for the numerus clausus principle
in real property law are even more persuasive in the intellectual property
context because the scope of intellectual property rights is more difficult to
delineate than the scope of real property rights. The metaphysical nature of
intellectual property prevents protected objects from being clearly
identifiable, particularly in a patent context, where inventions can be
independently created by multiple parties.
As a result, investigating the sale and licensing history of a work or
invention-and whether a work or invention is protected at all-is difficult,
costly, and sometimes impossible. This difficulty is compounded by the
absence of numerus clausus, which permits inscrutable licensing and sale
agreements and allows single works to be carved into several parts and
burdened by complicated usage rules.
By considering examples of digital content licensing and fragmentation
of particular copyrights, this Article will identify how a numerus clausus
principle for intellectual property would facilitate the use and conveyance
of intellectual property. This principle would benefit intellectual property
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owners, licensees, and the general public by lowering transaction costs and
preventing accidental overuse and underuse of intellectual works.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The numerus clausus principle, holding that property can only be
conveyed in certain standardized forms, is a lynchpin of American property
jurisprudence. Translated, numerus clausus means "the number is closed."'
For most of its history in the common law countries, the principle lacked a
name, but nonetheless functioned as a "deeply entrenched assumption of
the common law system of property rights." 2 Thomas W. Merrill and Henry
E. Smith were the first to discuss the principle in depth, borrowing the term

1. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle,110 YALE L.J. 1,4 (2000).
2. Id. at 20.
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"numerus clausus" from civil law countries, in which forms of ownership
were expressly limited to what the civil code allowed. Their article and
others that followed defended and discussed the numerus clausus principle
in American and English law, focusing primarily on how the principle
applies to transfers of real and personal property.4
The numerus clausus principle's central role in real and personal
property law stands in stark contrast to its nearly nonexistent role in
intellectual property law. Although Merrill, Smith, and others generally
assumed that the numerus clausus principle applied to intellectual property,5
in the context of patents and copyrights, the rule is numerus infinitis---"the
number is open." Nearly no limit exists to the forms in which protected
intellectual property can be licensed and sold. Yet, intellectual property
may be the area of law where the justifications for numerus clausus are at
their strongest.
This Article will explore the purported justifications for the numerus
clausus principle and why those justifications are so relevant to intellectual
property sales and licensing. Part U will summarize how the numerus
clausus principle has applied to physical property. Part III will describe the
effects of the numerus clausus principle on a property rights system. Part IV
will argue that the numerus clausus principle is absent in intellectual
property, and Part V will explain the effects of this absence. Part VI will
suggest areas of intellectual property law that would benefit from the
imposition of forms and the numerus clausus principle. Finally, Part VII
will address potential concerns with adopting a numerus clausus principle
for intellectual property.
II. THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS PRINCIPLE IN PROPERTY LAW
A. In Rem Rights Are Subject to the Numerus Clausus Principle
One way to understand the numerus clausus principle is to compare
how the law treats agreements in contract and property law. A "pervasive
difference" between the two is the ability of parties to customize the form

Id. at 4.
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1598 (2008); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property,
Contract,and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31
J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Francisco Parisi, Entropy in Property,50 AM. J. CoMp. L. 595,
625 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 4, at 1608 ("Intellectual property is another area
that yields a limited universe of clearly recognizable forms."); Merrill & Smith, supranote
1, at 12, 19 (describing the number of forms in property as "fixed for most purposes" but
acknowledging that "[t]he numerus clausus is probably at its weakest in the area of
intellectual property).
3.
4.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 80:235

of their agreements. 6 Contracts are generally governed by default rules that
can be freely altered by the contracting parties.! In contrast, a transfer of
real or tangible property is forbidden unless the transfer is permitted by law
and within one of "a limited number of standardized forms.' 4 Generally,
common law courts have not explicitly recognized the numerus clausus,
although in practice, courts "treat previously-recognized forms of property
as a closed list that can be modified only by the legislature," despite the
absence of any such instruction to that effect from legislatures themselves. 9
When parties try to enforce property rights that lie outside of the
recognized forms, courts shoe-horn those rights into one of the existing
forms. An example that appears frequently in case law is a lease "until the
end of the war." 0Courts have traditionally avoided enforcing leases lasting
until an event occurs--e.g., "until the end of the war"-even when the
intentions of and understanding between the landlord and tenant were clear.
Rather, courts effectively rewrite the lease to fit within one of the four

6.

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101

COLUM. L. Rv. 773, 776 (2001).
7.

Id.; see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and

ContractualConsent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 825 (1992) (cited in Merrill & Smith, supra note
6, at 776 n.10) (explaining that default rules subject to contractual modification are prevalent
throughout Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the common law of contracts);
Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S.CAL.
INTERDisc. L.J. 389, 390-92 (1992) (cited in Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 776 n.10)

(describing types and functions of default rules in contract law). Merrill and Smith explain
that few rules of contract law were mandatory, but that these included rules "found in the
areas of fraud, duress, and unconscionabiity,... in areas of particular regulatory concern
such as insurance,.., and in higher-order rules for what counts as contracting around a
default." Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 776 n.10 (citing Barnett, supra, at 825-26; E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 1.7, at 21 (3d. ed. 1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87, 119-20 (1989); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from MandatoryRules: PrivatizingLaw

Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 750 n. 198-99 (1999)).
8. Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 776. Additionally, treatises and reference
materials describe the list of permissible property interests being "closed." See Merrill &
Smith, supra note 1,at 3 n.2 (citing 1 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 11.01, at 11-1 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2012) ("This Treatise explores and discusses the
general principles of law that apply to 'permissible interests in land,' which courts and
legislatures have recognized."); CHARLES DONAHUE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 457 (3d ed.

1993)

("[Tlhe common law regarded the system of estates as closed."); JESSE DUKEMInER &
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 204 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing the "standardization of estates");
LEWIS M. SmnES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 61, at 45-46 (2d ed.
1956) (including a section titled "A Doctrine of Fixed Types of Estates")).
9. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 9-11.
10. See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.14, at 209-10 (A. James Casner ed.,
1952); 2 POWELL, supranote 8,§ 16.03[4][b], at 16-53.
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recognized forms for leasehold agreements: term of years, periodic tenancy,
tenancy at will, and tenancy at sufferance." Most courts have interpreted
leases that last until an event occurs as tenancies at will or periodic
have redefined the "term of years"
tenancies;' 2 although, some decisions
13
lease to include the lease at issue.
Similarly, testators have sometimes tried to grant an inheritor a sort of
"hybrid life estate"--a life estate in a piece of land, with the power to
convey or devise the property in fee simple. 14 In other words, the inheritor
with this "hybrid life estate" has the power to give away or sell the land, but
if he dies without devising the property, the remainder interest in the land is
supposed to go to the party named by the original testator. Some courts
have re-construed this interest to be a traditional life estate, 5 and others
have declared that it creates a fee simple interest.16 In no cases have courts
upheld this type of hybrid estate. Merrill and Smith characterized the
courts' decisions by observing, "[A]IU courts recognize that the task is to
squeeze the [property] interest into one of the established categories, the
only question being which standardized box is most consistent with the
of policy concerns such
testator's intentions or is otherwise 'best' in terms
17
as promoting the free alienability of property. ,

11.

See 2 POWELL, supra note 8, §§ 16.03-.06, at 16-43 to 16-81;

SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 2:1-:26,
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 39.02(c), at 492 (David A. Thomas ed.,

ROBERT

S.

at 30-83 (1980); 4
1994).

12. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 11; see also Nat'l Bellas Hess v. Kalis, 191
F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1951); Stanmeyer v. Davis, 53 N.E.2d 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944); Lace v.
Chandler, 1 All. Eng. Rep. 305 (K.B. 1944).
13. See, e.g., Smith's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 267, 268 (D.C.
Cir. 1946) (concluding that a "term of years" requires only that the lease be certain to end,
and that a tenancy until the end of "the present war" was a term of years); see also Merrill &
Smith, supra note 1, at 11 n.28 (explaining that "the minority of courts" which have upheld
leases for the length of a war have "generally done so by changing the definition of a term of
years, . . . not by declaring that the parties are free to modify the available forms of leases by
contract").
14. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 13 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 12.1 cmt. b (1984); 1

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,

supra note 10, § 2.15 at 126-27).
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Bell, 31 U.S. 68 (1832); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton,
468 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo. 1971).
16. See, e.g., Sumner v. Borders, 98 S.W.2d 918,919-20 (Ky. 1936); Fox v. Snow, 76
A.2d 877, 877-78 (N.J. 1950) (per curiam). Merrill and Smith note that the hybrid estate
could also be characterized as "a springing executory interest subject to the power of
appointment by the original grantee." Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 14 n.44 (citing
HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

590-91 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey

eds., 1994)).
17. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 14.
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B. The Forms of Real and Tangible Property under the Numerus Clausus
Principle
Common law courts have followed the numerus clausus principle in
every area of real and tangible property law. There are five types of presentpossessory interests in land: the fee simple absolute, the defeasible fee
simple, the (nearly-defunct) fee tail, 8 the life estate, and the lease.' 9 The
defeasible fees and leases have different sub-types.20 Each presentpossessory interest, aside from the fee simple, corresponds to a similarly
limited list of future interests: reversions, remainders, powers of
termination, and executory interests. 21 Remainders have numerous subtypes as well,22 and executory interests may be either springing or
shifting.2 a As a practical matter, estates other than the fee simple
and lease
24
for a term of years are rarely encountered in the present day.
At any given time, multiple parties can hold interests in a piece of
property as well. Merrill and Smith note that the "basic categories" of
concurrent property interests are tenancies in common, joint tenancies,

18. The fee tail was an estate that could not be sold, devised, or alienated by the
owner, but which passed by law to the owner's heirs after his death. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). England generally eliminated the fee tail through its Law of
Property Act 1925, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/1516/20/contents. In the United States, only Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island recognize the fee tail, although "disentailing" can be accomplished by deed. See C.
DONAHUE, T. KAUPER, & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 391, § 196 (3d ed., West Publishing
Co., 1993); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 33-6-10. No state's law recognizes the fee tail in its original

form.
19. Merrill & Smith, supranote 1, at 13 (citing I POWELL, supra note 8, § 12.01[2], at
12-5).
20. In the case of defeasible fees, there is the fee simple determinable, fee simple
subject to condition subsequent, and fee simple subject to an executory limitation. See
Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 13 n.34 (citing ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 35-36 (2d ed. 1993)). In the case of the lease, as discussed, there is the tenancy for
a term of years, periodic tenancy, tenancy at will, and tenancy at sufferance. See supra note
11 and accompanying text.
21. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 20, at 86 (cited in Merrill & Smith, supra
note 1, at 13 n.36).
22. Remainders can be indefeasibly vested, contingent, vested subject to open, and
vested subject to complete defeasance. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 20, at 97 (cited in
Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 13 n.36).
23. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 20, at 107-12 (cited in Merrill & Smith, supra
note 1, at 13 n.36).

24. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 13; see also id. at 13 n.40 (explaining that life
estates are still encountered, but mostly as equitable interests conveyed in trusts);
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 20, at 28 (describing the fee simple absolute and lease for a
term of years as the only estates that are "commercially" saleable).
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marital property, trusts, and finally condominiums, cooperatives, and
timeshares. 2 Concurrent property interests have changed significantly in
the past several decades and century, but Merrill and Smith are quick to
note that "these changes have almost always been the product of legislative
reforms, not judicial rulings." 26 For example, condominiums were all but
unheard of until the 1960s, when most states adopted statutes expressly
authorizing their creation.27
The numerus clausus principle also applies to nonpossessory property
interests, or interests that confer rights of use rather than possession.2 The
four general forms of nonpossessory property interests are easements, real
covenants, equitable servitudes, and profits. 29 Equitable servitudes are a
rare, recent example of a judge-made form of property right, created in
1848.30
Tangible personal property is, in practice, subject to substantially fewer
and simpler forms than real property. It is generally accepted that one
cannot hold a nonpossessory interest in personal property. 31 Although
references suggest that personal property might be subject to the same
possessory forms that apply to estates in land,3 there are "few if any cases
25.

Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 15.

26.

Id.

27.

Id. at 16 (citing Curtis J. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory

Foundation,63 CoLu. L. REv. 987, 1001-03 (1963); Henry Hansmann, Condominium and
Cooperative Housing: TransactionalEfficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 25, 61-63 (1991)).

28. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 16.
29. As with possessory property interests, there are several subtypes of nonpossessory
property interests, although sources characterize them in different ways. Id. at 16 n.57.
30. See Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848); Merrill & Smith, supra note
1, at 16-17 (describing the circumstances under which Tulk v. Moxhay was decided).
31. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 18-19; Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 906-10 (2008); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 977-80 (1928) (describing how the English
Court of Chancery held that equitable servitudes cannot be placed on chattels). Although one

New Hampshire court upheld what amounted to an equitable servitude in a jukebox, the
court's anomalous decision amounts to the "exception that proves the rule." See Pratte v.
Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and
Round: EquitableServitudes and Chattels, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1956) (discussing Pratte
v. Balatsos). Arguably, bailments, bills of lading, and warehouse receipts create
nonpossessory interests and obligations in chattels, although Merrill and Smith characterize
bailments as interests that fall in a gray area between contract and property. See Merrill &
Smith, supra note 6, at 811-20.
32. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 20, at 25; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROPERTY § 9 cmt. a (1936) (explaining that "[i]nterests that are quite analogous" to interests
in land exist in chattels). Life estates and remainders can be created in personal property,
although nowadays "virtually anyone who wants to create complicated future interests in
personal property... does so through a trust." See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 18
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that address... whether.., exotic interests such as defeasible fees and
executory interests can be created in personal property."33
The aversion to the creation of complex forms of personal property
interests is understandable. As Blackstone observed, when criticizing the
creation of life estates in chattels,
[Personal property] being things transitory, and by many accidents subject
to be lost, destroyed, or otherwise impaired, and the exigencies of trade
requiring also a frequent circulation thereof, it would occasion perpetual
suits and quarrels, and put a stop to the freedom of commerce, if [future
interests] were generally tolerated and allowed.34

III. EFFECTS OF THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS PRINCIPLE
At first blush, the numerus clausus principle seems suspect because it
can thwart the intentions and expectations of transacting parties, as well as
the plain language of documents conveying property. In order to justify the
numerus clausus principle, this drawback must be outweighed by other
benefits.
A. Justificationsfor the Numerus ClaususPrinciplein PropertyLaw
There are three primary benefits that have been advanced as

justifications for the numerus clausus principle: maintaining the alienability
of property, 35 minimizing information costs to third parties (as opposed to
the transferor and transferee) encountering property,36 and facilitating
verification of ownership rights.3 7 In other words, if the numerus clausus
principle were eliminated, property rights would be substantially more

difficult to discover, comprehend, and convey.

(citing Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 1986);

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY
OF WILLS

§ 153(1) (1936); 3 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW

§ 37.66 (1961); SIMES & SMITH, supra note 8, § 359, at 385-86); see also 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *398 (explaining that while the common law originally
forbade future interests in personal property, English courts eventually permitted bequests of
life estates and remainders).
33. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 18.
34. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *398.
35. See Carol M. Rose, What Government Can Do ForProperty (and Vice Versa), in
THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209, 21415 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries
of PrivateProperty, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176-78 (1999); see also Johnson v. Whiton, 34
N.E. 542, 542 (Mass. 1893). See generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE
ALIENATION OF PROPERTY

(2d ed. 1895).

36.

See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 25-34.

37.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 4, at 373.

2013]
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While these justifications have competed for being the best explanation
for the numerus clausus principle's existence, all three are affected, to some
degree, by the standardization of property rights. As a result, this Article
will consider them to be complementary, rather than competing,
justifications for the numerus clausus principle.
1. Facilitating the Alienation of Property
Numerous scholars maintain that "alienability is necessary for property
to achieve its highest-value use and thus further social welfare." 3 - The
notion of using the numerus clausus principle to prevent undue restraints on
alienation most famously appears in Oliver Wendell Holmes' opinion,
Johnson v. Whiton.39 In Johnson v. Whiton, a testator, Royall Whiton,
granted land "to Sarah A. Whiton and her heirs on her father's side. ''4 ° In
refusing to effectuate the devise, Justice Holmes commented that he could
not construe the will as written because to do so would "put it out of the
power of the owners to give clear title for generations.' ' Holmes evoked
the numerus clausus principle to avoid such undue restraints on property
alienation-a value also present in other property law doctrines, such as the
rules against perpetuities. 42
2. Lowering Measurement Costs
Unconvinced by the alienability justification, Merrill and Smith argue
that the numerus clausus principle works to limit the information costs to
third parties wanting to interact with particular pieces of property (for
example, those who want to buy or use property). This concern was evoked
in the 1834 Court of Chancery decision Keppell v. Baile, in which the
court refused to enforce an unrecognized type of servitude. In its decision,
Lord Chancellor Brougham wrote,
[G]reat detriment would arise and much confusion of rights if parties were
allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real property, and to
impress upon their lands and tenements a peculiar character, which should

38. Note, Fragmentation in Copyright, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1758 (2011) (citing
John Henry Merryman, Comment, Policy, Autonomy, and the Numerus Clausus in Italian
and American Property Law, 12 AM. J. CoMP. L. 224, 226 (1963); Richard Epstein, Why
Restrain Alienation?, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 970, 971-72 (1985)). See generally GRAY, supra
note 35.
39. Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1893).
40. Id. at 542 (cited in Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 24).
41. Id. at 542.
42. See Heller, supra note 35, at 1179-80.
43. Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch. 1834).

TENNESSEE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 80:235

follow them into all hands, however remote.... [I]t would hardly be
possible to know what rights the acquisition of any parcel conferred, or
what obligation it imposed.4

Merrill and Smith explain the information-cost justification of numerus
clausus by observing,
When individuals encounter property rights, they face a measurement
problem. In order to avoid violating another's property rights, they must
ascertain what those rights are ....The need for standardization in

property law stems from an externality involving measurement costs:
Parties who create new property rights will not take into account the full
of the measurement costs they impose on strangers to the
magn'tude
45
title.

Merrill and Smith use the example of a Monday property right in a
watch to illustrate their point. 6 Once one person has created a Mondayonly right in a watch, "anyone else buying a watch must now also
investigate whether any particular watch does not include Monday rights. 47
This observation highlights the distinction between potential successors of a
particular property right and other market participants. If one unit of
property has a peculiar character, potential successors must suffer the costs
of discovering and understanding that character. Moreover, other market
participants must now investigate whether any other property they
encounter also shares this peculiar character. "Limiting the number of basic

property forms allows a market participant or a potential violator to limit
his or her inquiry to whether the interest does or does not have the features
of the forms on the menu."' 8 Merrill and Smith acknowledge the costs
49
imposed by standardization as well, particularly frustration of interest.

However, they submit that some standardization can strike the right balance
between measurement-cost externalities and the frustration costs created by
limiting forms."0

3. Aiding Verification of Ownership Rights
Finally, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argue that the goal of
numerus clausus is to "aid verification of the ownership rights offered for

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1049 (quoted in Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 25-26).
Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 26-27.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 34.
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conveyance.,,51 Their concern is less with third parties, and more with the
parties that already have a stake or interest in an asset. They observe,
If two parties are both to have rights in a single asset, they need some
means of assuring they share a common understanding of those rights.
Absent such understanding, the parties may mistakenly make inconsistent
uses of the asset or underuse the asset. This is the problem with
"coordination." Moreover,... each needs assurance that the other will not
opportunistically assert rights that properly belong to the other. This is the
problem of "enforcement." The less effectively the parties solve the
coordination and enforcement problems, the greater the scope for mistakes
or opportunism and hence the less valuable will be the rights involved, for
reasons that are apparent: the parties may take costly private actions to
protect their rights; investments in improving and using assets may be
discouraged; privately bome risk may increase;
and transactions that
52
would otherwise take place may not occur.
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that each party with rights to an asset,
as well as a third-party enforcer such as a judge, needs a method to
"verify[]" each party's "understanding of the parties' respective rights" in
order to solve the "coordination" and "enforcement" problems they
identify. 53 The numerus clausus principle facilitates this understanding by
limiting the types of property interests available.
B. The Numerus ClaususPrincipleDoes Not Benefit Contracts
One might reasonably ask why the purported benefits of a numerus
clausus system in property law would not justify similar limitations in the
formation of contracts. The answer arises from the key difference between
contract and property-contract law generally involves the creation and
treatment of in personam rights, and property law generally involves in rem
rights. In personam rights avow against particular, known people or entities.
When Ann makes a contract with Ben to mow Ann's lawn, only Ben has an
obligation to mow Ann's lawn, and only Ann has an obligation to pay Ben
for his services. In contrast, in rem rights avow against numerous, unknown
people ,5 4and are resultingly often characterized as "rights against the
world.

51.
52.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 373.
Id. at 382-83.

53. Id. at 383.
54. Drawing from Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's 1917 article Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Juridical Reasoning, Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith
described the nature of an in rem right, specifying four qualities. See Merrill & Smith, supra
note 6, at 780, 783 (discussing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions
as Applied in JuridicalReasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917)). They wrote,
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Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld thought in rem rights were a composite of
in personam rights-many pairs of people in which one person had a right,
and the other had a corresponding duty to respect that right."5 Merrill and
Smith, citing J.E. Penner, take a different and more metaphysically
appealing view: that "in personarn rights attach directly to specific persons,
whereas in rem rights attach to a person only because of their relationship
to a particular 'thing.' 5 6 If an owner sells land to another, the public's duty
remains unchanged because, in effect, its duty is to not bother with the
property. 7 Similarly, if the "thing" to which one has rights or duties is
destroyed, the existence of the associated rights and duties disappears as
well.5
Discussing in rem rights raises the question of whether property rights
are really a unified "right to a thing" or are merely a "bundle of sticks."
Conceiving of all property as "a bundle of sticks"--as comprising a set of
rights-rather than as "a distinctive type of right to a thing, good against the
world"5 9 has come to dominate legal discourse. Although property
traditionally includes the rights to exclude others, to use, and to alienate, the
"bundle of sticks" philosophy holds that "[labeling something as proper%
does not predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it.'

(1) [Un rem rights are characterized by both an indefinite class of dutyholders
and by a large number of dutyholders;
(2) in rem rights are not simply aggregations of in personam rights, but are
qualitatively different in that they attach to persons through their relationships
to particular things rather than as persons;
(3) in rem rights are numerous and indefinite in two directions - not only does
each in rem right give rise to a large and indefinite number of dutyholders,
but also each dutyholder holds such duties to a large and indefinite number of
rightholders; and
(4) in rem rights are always claims to abstentions by others as opposed to claims
to performances on the part of others.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 783. Merrill and Smith note that, in 1920, Albert Kocourek
hypothesized that a rightholder could, for example, grant an easement to everyone in the
world but one, thus creating a definite and singular dutyholder regarding an in rem right. See
id. at 783-84 (discussing Albert Kocourek, Rights in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 322 (1920)).
But, as Merrill and Smith observe, this situation does not apply in virtually every real-world
case.
55.

See generally Hohfeld, supra note 54.

56.
57.
58.

Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 786-87.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 787.

59. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001).

60.

Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IowA L. REv. 277,297 (1998).
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"[P]roperty is simply a label for whatever 'bundle of sticks' the individual
has been granted.'
Merrill and Smith, adding their voices to the chorus of natural rights
theorists from antiquity to the present day, take issue with the "bundle of
rights" view, holding instead that property is indeed a "distinctive type" of
right "to a thing." 62 Their view has an intuitive appeal. People generally
believe that, when someone else owns a thing, they must abstain from
trespassing upon it. This is a holistic intuition; the mind does not
necessarily break down its belief in a duty to abstain into all the possible
actions one must abstain from.
But Merrill and Smith conflate the ideas that (1) property is a
distinctive, unified right, rather than a bundle of sticks, and that (2) property
is an in rem right, rather than an in personam right.63 Hohfield thought that
in rem rights were really just bundles of in personam rights, but that is not
the only way of conceiving of bundles of rights. 64 We can also think of
certain rights as bundles of in rem rights-bundles of discrete relations
between a person and a thing, which numerous, unidentified others have a
duty to respect.65

61.

Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV.

1044, 1086 (1984).
62. Merrill & Smith, supra note 59, at 360.
63.

Id. at 358.

64. Id. at 364; Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 782.
65. This conception is quite useful in the intellectual property context, where many of
the reasons for treating in rem rights differently from in personam rights may apply, but
where many different rights are unquestionably "bundled" together. For example, what we
call a "copyright" is a bundle of at least six in rem rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly, and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). The six rights that make up the core of a copyright already fail to
resemble a holistic "right to a (metaphysical) thing." Merrill & Smith, supra note 59, at 357.
The right to perform copyrighted works publicly is protected-but private performance is
not. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). There is no copyright protection in performing (i.e.,
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Therefore, regardless of whether one holds to Blackstone's theory that
physical property is the "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
right of any other individual,"" or to the more realist notion that property is
an "infinitely variable collection of rights, powers and duties, '67 the
question of whether a right is in rem is a separate issue.
The in rem nature of property is the primary reason that property law
merits a numerus clausus principle and contract law does not. In rem rights
require "[large numbers of people... [to] process information about
resources. ' The numerus clausus principle lowers "the unit costs of
processing the information... so that the total cost of allocating use rights
in... society... is much lower than it would be if all use rights had to be
established individually[,]" 69 as is the case in contract law, where in
personam rights are concerned. Every in rem right imposes information
costs on a large and indefinite class of people.70 Each variation in the nature
of an in rem right can impose information costs on many dutyholders. Thus,
"[t]o prevent the creation of [excessive] information costs, in rem rights are
everywhere limited to a small number of standardized types.'
Standardization aimed at facilitating the alienability of rights is also
important in an in rem system. Alienability allows a res to move to highervalued uses over time-an important effect when a res stays in existence
over a long period. Because parties to particular contracts rarely change and
because the life of a contract is frequently substantially shorter than the life
of a piece of property, the interest in rights moving to those who value them
more highly is of less consequence in contract law.

playing) a sound recording non-digitally-in other words, over the radio waves. See 17
U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006). The author of a musical work cannot exclude others from copying
and performing the work, so long as they pay a fee. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). Perhaps
most importantly, there is no exclusive right to use a copyrighted work, although MAI
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. effectually allows for digital usage rights to be
controlled by copyright holders. 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993).
66. 2 BLAcKSTONE, supra note 32, at *2.
67. Merrill & Smith, supra note 59, at 365.
68. Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 794.
69. Id.
70. These costs are lowest for those who merely want to avoid trespassing on

another's right and highest for those who want to interact with or acquire the right. See
Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 489-95
(2004).
71.

Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 796.
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IV. THE NUMERUS CLAUSUS PRINCIPLE IS ABSENT IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

Like physical property, intellectual property is held in rem; both
physical and intellectual property rights avow against a "numerous and
indefinite class" of dutyholders. Thus, given the pervasive presence of the
numerus clausus principle in real and tangible property law and the
particular benefits the principle bestows on systems of in rem rights, one
would expect intellectual property to be subject to a numerus clausus
principle as well.
Curiously, the numerus clausus principle is almost entirely absent from
intellectual property law.72 Intellectual property can be held and conveyed
without the limitation of forms, although the literature on numerus clausus
explains this issue in a somewhat confusing manner. Merrill and Smith
claim that there are forms of intellectual property interests, stating, "The
main [such] forms . . . are patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade
secrets., 73 Nestor M. Davidson echoes, "Intellectual property is yet another
area that yields a limited universe of clearly recognized forms. Patents and
copyrights are the primary forms, with trademarks and
74 trade secrets having
a somewhat uncomfortable place in the menagerie."
But saying that the "forms" of intellectual property include patents and
copyrights is like saying that the "forms" of physical property include
estates in land, chattels, water rights, and carbon emissions. This conception
looks past the role that the numerus clausus principle plays in controlling
how rights are fragmented. Inventions and works of authorship are
examples of what a person can have a property right in, just as one can have
property interests in houses, pieces of jewelry, and ground water. We use
specialized words for property rights in intellectual objects-patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets-just as we use specialized
language to describe property rights in water, such as riparian rights or
rights by prior appropriation. These terms indicate the extent of the whole
property interest or asset, such as what is protected and for how long. But
they are not the forms in which one can hold those rights.
Forms (e.g., fee simple, life estate) and assets (e.g., estates, patents) are
easy to conflate because the numerus clausus principle limits both.
Numerus clausus prevents the creation of completely new assets beyond
those created by courts and legislatures-one cannot hold a property right
in a law of nature or the information in a phone book. But it also places
limits on how recognized property rights or assets may be carved up. One

72. The primary exceptions, discussed infra, are the first sale doctrine in copyright
law and the doctrine of exhaustion in patent law. For purposes of standing, patent ownership
is also only divisible in a few ways.
73. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 19.
74. Davidson, supra note 4, at 1608.
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may hold a fee simple interest in a piece of land or all rights granted by the
copyright statute in a creative work; in these cases, one holds the form of
the entire property right. One can also hold a property interest in part of a
whole asset, such as a life estate in a piece of land. But one cannot own land
only on days when it is raining, or create a lease until the end of a war.
To further illustrate the numerus clausus principle's absence from
intellectual property assets, consider again a piece of land and a copyright.
The entire property interest in a piece of land can be subdivided
horizontally, across several persons, or vertically, across time. But rights
must be divided in a recognized form. For example, we know from the
previous part that Ann can leave a life interest in her home to Ben and the
remainder to Carl, but she cannot give Ben a life interest and the option to
devise the property, with the rest of the property interest going to Carl. 75 A
person can have a property interest in a piece of land, but how that property
interest may be divided is subject to the numerus clausus principle.
Conversely, a person can have a copyright in a written story, but how that
person's copyright interest may be divided is not subject to the limitation of
particular forms.
The unlimited forms of patents and copyrights do not manifest as
variations on the defeasible fees or as altered life estates. Rather, patentees
and copyright holders typically carve up their patents and copyrights into
the enumerated exclusive rights granted by the patent and copyright acts
and share them horizontally among numerous owners through license or
assignment. 76 For example, one party could hold a copyright in a novel but

75.

See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.

76. There are hints of numerus clausus in intellectual property law from the earlier
part of the twentieth century, most of which have been abandoned now. For example, the
indivisibility doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1909 required all of the exclusive rights of
copyright to be held by one party or group, and Mark Lemley argues that this rule aimed to
avoid fragmentation that would complicate the task of defending against lawsuits and
avoiding lawsuits by negotiating for permission to use copyrighted works upfront. Mark A.
Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547,
569-72 (1997) (cited in Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in
Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REv. 549, 601 (2010) (noting the difficulties associated with
obtaining permission to use divided copyrights when one activity implicates several owners'
rights)). Nimmer notes that "[t]he purpose of such indivisibility was to protect alleged
infringers from the harassment of successive lawsuits." 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NImmER, NImmER ON COPYRUGHT § 10.01[A] (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2012). Former
copyright registrar Abraham Kaminstein wrote in his 1957 study of the issue, "From the
viewpoint of ease of tracing title and purposes of suit, it is much simpler to require that only
the author or his assignee can control the copyright." Abraham L. Kaminstein, Senate
Judiciary Committee, 86th Cong., Study No. II Divisibility of Copyrights, in Copyright
Law Revision Studies Nos. 11-13, at I(1960) (cited in Van Houweling, supra,at 602). Early
twentieth-century courts also worked to locate all rights in collected works in a single entity.
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling notes that early twentieth-century cases "strain[ed] to find, in
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at the same time have sold the right to make a derivative film of the work to

a movie studio. 77 Even more common, however, is the use of licenses that

convey a combination of limited, nonexclusive copying rights and

idiosyncratic nonpossessory property interests, or usage rights, in a work or
invention. 78 These licenses have been routinely upheld by courts as

contracts and are only invalidated when they are found to be
unconscionable.7 9
V. EFFECTS OF THE ABSENCE OF NUMERUS CLAUSUS ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The numerus clausus principle facilitates the alienation of property,
lowers the costs of investigating property rights, and helps those with an
actual or potential interest in a particular piece of property to understand the
scope of their rights. Therefore, one would expect that a property rights
system that lacked a numerus clausus principle would result in the presence
of significant restraints on the alienation of property, increased transaction
costs of property conveyance, and confusion over the scope of property

rights. These effects are visibly present in intellectual property law.
A. Restraints on the Alienation of Property
A property rights system that permitted substantial customization
would likely develop articles that could not be conveyed, due to either the

the absence of express language between the parties to the contrary, that a magazine
publisher acquired all the rights in a contribution to the author." See Van Houweling, supra,
at 596 (citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, at § 10.01). Although fragmentation of a
copyright among several owners is explicitly permitted by the copyright statute today, the
Ninth Circuit expressed discomfort with this result in Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 781
(9th Cir. 2002). In Gardner,the Ninth Circuit held that the exclusive licensee of only some
of the rights included in a copyright could not transfer that license without the express
permission of the original licensor. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 781. Its holding is similar to
disallowing a Monday property right in a watch or other non-standard form. The decision
has been criticized as not giving effect to the clear terms of the Copyright Act. See Van
Houweling, supra, at 625-26.
77. See, e.g., Fields v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 1202 (1950); Herwig v. United States, 105 F.
Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
78. See generally Van Houweling, supra note 31; Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the
Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with
Clickwrap Misuse, 30 Omo N.U. REV.495 (2004).
79. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The God Paradox,89 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1047 (2009)
("EULAs are enforceable unless unconscionable."); see also Loren, supra note 78, at 508-10
(discussing how the doctrine of unconscionability would function in the context of
shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses).
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creation of an anticommons or a contractual agreement that prevented a
party from reconveying an article.
1. Prohibitions on Reconveyance
Intellectual property has developed limited aspects of the numerus
clausus principle as applied to particular copies of patented inventions or
copyrighted works. Known in intellectual property jurisprudence as the
"first sale doctrine" or the "doctrine of exhaustion," particular copies, once
sold, cannot be subject to further control by the copyright or patent holder
that owns the work or invention. The particular article may be used or
alienated freely, so long as the owner of the article does not copy it or
otherwise infringe on any other rights of the copyright or patent holder.80
The first sale doctrine is a form of the numerus clausus principle
because it effectively acts as a prohibition on nonpossessory property
interests in particular copies of copyrighted works and patented inventions.
Like other personal property, the first sale doctrine prevents sold, patented,
or copyrighted goods from being burdened with servitudes; their ownership
is limited to the possessory interests available in tangible, personal
property. In patent law, the doctrine of exhaustion is judge-made.81 For
copyrights, the first sale doctrine originated at common law,' 2 but was then
adopted in the Copyright Act of 1909.83 The doctrine's purpose is

80.

Examples include using a sold script to perform a copyrighted work.

81. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. Am. L. 487, 511 (2011); see also

Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Adams v. Burks, 1 F. Cas. 100 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1871). According to the Supreme Court, the first sale doctrine is essential because
patentees:
are entitled to but one royalty for a patented machine, and consequently when a
patentee has himself constructed the machine and sold it, or authorized another to
construct and sell it, or to construct and use and operate it, and the consideration
has been paid to him for the right, he has then to that extent parted with his
monopoly, and ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine so sold or so
authorized to be constructed and operated.
Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863) (cited in Hovenkamp, supra, at 513 n.109);
see also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (holding that
determination of exhaustion rests on "whether or not there has been such a disposition of the
article that it may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward for the use of the
article") (cited in Hovenkamp, supra,at 513 n. 109).
82. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV.
889, 908-12 (2011); see also Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
83. Section 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909 provided, "[N]othing in this Act shall be
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the
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frequently cited as being crucial to preventing undue restraints on the
alienation of property. 4
However, the first sale doctrine, or doctrine of exhaustion, disappears
when works are instantiated in a digital, rather than in an analog or
physical, context. There is no first sale doctrine for digital works. The ideas
of "copy" and "use" in copyright law have been merged in a digital context,
due to the Ninth Circuit decision MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer
Inc., which held that a copy of a software program in RAM qualified as a
copy for copyright infringement purposes.
As a result, many pieces of software and digital content simply cannot
be legally transferred from one party to another. For example, users of
Amazon's eBook reader, the Kindle, are granted
"a non-exclusive right to view, use, and display such Kindle Content...
solely for [the reader's] personal, non-commercial use.",86 Unless
specifically instructed otherwise, readers may "not sell, rent, lease,

possession of which has been lawfully obtained."
84. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 81, at 493 ("The first sale doctrine grew out of
the common law's strong policy against restraints on alienation .... "); Brian W. Carver,
Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential
Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1890 (2010) ("[E]xhaustion has reconciled copyright

law with property law policies that disfavor restraints on alienation."); 2 NIMMER &NIMMER,
supra note 76, at §8.12[A] (After the first sale, "the policy favoring a copyright monopoly
for authors gives way to the policy opposing restraints of trade and restraints on alienation.")
(cited in Vivian F. Wang, Sale or License? UMG v. Augusto, Verner v. Autodesk, and the
First Sale Doctrine, 19 TEX. INTELL. PRop. L.J. 1, 2 (2010)); H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 2
(1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899 ("The first sale doctrine has its roots in
the English common law rule against restraints on alienation of property. American courts

have affirmed the doctrine and distinguished between the owner's exclusive rights in the
copyright and the rights of the owner of an object embodying a work that is under
copyright.") (cited in Wang, supra, at 2 n.5).
85. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); see
also JESSICA LITMAN,

DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 92

(2001) ("For all works encoded in digital form,

any act of reading or viewing the work would require the use of a computer.... and would,
under this interpretation, involve an actionable reproduction."). Even absent the holding in
MAI Systems, the proliferation of hard drives would have contributed to the merging of
"usage" and "copying," as programs are now rarely run from CDs or disks. Although 17
U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) permits an "owner of a copy of a computer program to make... another
copy... of that computer program provided... that such a new copy... is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner," this "essential step" exception does not apply to copying
software that has been licensed but not sold. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006).
86. Amazon Kindle License Agreement and Terms of Service, 1. Kindle Content,
AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref'hp_200699130_

storeTOU 1?nodeld=201014950 (last updated Sept. 6, 2012).
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distribute, broadcast, sublicense or otherwise assign an.rights to the
Kindle Content or any portion of it to any third party ....
The Microsoft Office 2010 license also specifies that its software "is
licensed, not sold.,,88 Specifically, Microsoft forbids "rent[ing], leas[ing] or
lend[ing] the software." 9 Furthermore, Microsoft software marked "Not for
Resale" cannot be resold.9°
Even software-embedded devices, such as digital cameras, have been
sold with use restrictions. For example, a Canon EOS-ID digital camera's
license agreement states that the consumer shall not "assign, sublicense,
sell, rent, lease, loan, convey or otherwise transfer to any third party, or
copy, duplicate, translate or convert to another programming language the
Software [that runs in the camera], except as expressly provided herein.' 91
Licenses and terms of use are not completely limited to disembodied
software, which can be placed on any number of machines. For example,
patented goods can be licensed without triggering the doctrine of
exhaustion. Monsanto licenses seeds to farmers that include the following
terms:
This seed carries a limited license under U.S. patent 5,352,605 solely to
produce a single commercial crop in one and only one season. This license
does not extend to the seed from such crop or the progeny thereof by
propagation or seed multiplication. The use of such seed or the ]ogeny
thereof for propagation or seed multiplication is strictly prohibited.

87. Id.
88. Microsoft Software License Terms for Microsoft Office 2010 § 7, OFFICE.COM,
httpi/office.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-software-license-terms-for-microsoft-offce2010-HA101817777.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
89. Id.
90. See id.
at §§ 1(10), 2(10), 3(10).
91. Canon EOS-iD Mark H N Firmware License Agreement, available at
http://web.canon.jp/Imaging/eosldm2n/eosldmk2nfirmware-e.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2013) (cited in Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? ContractingAround
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEo. MAsON L. REv. 93, 97 n.13 (2006)).
Winston observes that "[a]s the licensor cannot loan, convey, or otherwise transfer the
software to another, the licensor cannot lend the camera to anyone else-even to take a
family picture." Winston, supra, at n.13
92. Monsanto Co. v. Good, No. Civ.A.01-5678 FLW, 2004 WL 1664013, at *2
(D.N.J. Jul. 23, 2004) (citing Mem. in Supp. of Monsanto Co.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J.)
(cited in Winston, supra note 91, at 95-97). As of 2005, Monsanto had defended its seed
licenses in almost 100 lawsuits and won over $15 million in court judgments. See Winston,
supra note 91, at 103 (citing Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Monsanto Assault on U.S.
Farmers Detailed
in
New Report
(Jan.
13,
2005),
available at
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org2 5/ /13/Monsanto-assault-on-u-s-farmers-detailedin-new-report/).
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Thus, the ability of patent and copyright holders to license specific uses
of inventions and authored works often results in an explicit prohibition of
the alienation of intellectual property.
2. Excessive Fragmentation/Anticommons
Closely related to the idea of undue restraints on alienation is the
concern that excessive fragmentation of property rights could give rise to an
anticommons problem. In a situation where someone wants to use a piece
of property, having too many fragments controlled by separate parties can
make the transaction costs of paying for that use too high. Blocking patents
is one example-for instance, when one party owns a patent to a machine
and another owns a process patent to use the machine in a certain way.
Someone wanting to manufacture the patented machines in order to
undertake the patented process must gain permission from both parties to
use the one kind of device. The cost of negotiating use rights is increased
because two parties have to be negotiated with instead of one. Depending
on how beneficial the patented machines will likely be to the new
manufacturer, the increased negotiating cost could be enough to render the
project not worth undertaking.
Another example of a tragedy of the anticommons occurs after multiple
works are incorporated into a new, derivative work. Often, the original
works are licensed for very limited purposes, such as to be used on
broadcast television, and must be relicensed for the work to appear in other
media. For example, in 2010, MTV released the DVD set for the cartoon
series Daria, which was broadcast on MTV from 1997 to 2002. 9' The
original television series used clips from contemporary popular songs in its
episodes, but the high cost of licensing the songs for the DVDs prevented
them from appearing on the DVD release of the entire series. Series creator
Glenn Eichler explained, "99 percent of the music has been changed,
because the cost of licensing the many music bites we used would have
made it impossible to release the collection (and for many years did) ....

Because so many parties held
[T]hese aren't the shows as aired... .,94
rights over parts of the Daria series, creators were unable to release it on
DVD as it originally was aired, electing instead to remove almost the
entirety of the original soundtrack. 95 The television series WKRP in
Cincinnati was also released with a changed soundtrack for similar
reasons. 96 As animated filmmaker Nina Paley explains, the cost of licensing

93.
appeared
94.
95.
96.

Letter from Glenn Eichler (2010) (on file with author). Glenn Eichler's note
inside the DVD box of Daria: Complete Animated Series, released in 2010.
Id.
Id.
Alex Tabarrok, WKRP and the Tragedy of the Anti-Commons, MARGINAL

REVOLUTION

(Apr. 1, 2011, 7:10 AM), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution
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can be prohibitively high due to the cost of negotiating licenses.
Discussing her own attempts to license songs sung by Annette Hanshaw for
her independent animated film, Sita Sings the Blues, Paley explained that
she could not negotiate a lower licensing fee:
There was no way to negotiate their contract, because it would have cost
[the corporation that owned the copyrights] more to negotiate than they
would have gotten from me. The [default] contract is $3,500 per song, and
it would have cost them more than $3,500 for their lawyers to revisit the
contract and modify it.
I must emphasize this is a system problem. This is not an individual's
problem. Everyone involved in this is truly just doing their job. It's the
system itself that is broken. If you can't negotiate the contracts because it
costs more
money to negotiate a reasonable deal than they could earn, it is
9
crazy.

For Daria to be released on DVD, the creators of the show would have
needed to renegotiate a license for every song originally included in the
show-literally dozens. Although the episodes, as they aired, constituted
completed, new works, those pieces of culture are now effectively lost.
Because the rights could not be renegotiated, the program cannot be rereleased as it originally aired.
The fact that so many parties had a veto over the re-release of Daria
and WKRP in Cincinnatiis exemplary of a tragedy of the anticommons-a
situation where too many parties with veto power over the use of a piece of
property prevent it from being used effectively. This type of anticommons,
appearing in works that incorporate other copyrighted works or are derived
from them, is possible because the numerus infinitus principle in copyright
law allows works to be licensed for very limited purposes.
B. High Measurement-CostExternalities
A property right system without a numerus clausus principle would
likely impose significant costs on parties trying to purchase or use property
as they sought to determine the owner of the property and the rights in the
property available for purchase. One also would see costs in the form of
mistakes made from misunderstanding what a party was buying.

/2011/04/gridlock-at-wkrp-in-cincinnati.html.
97. Id.
98. Frequently
Asked
Questions,
SrrA
SINGS
THE
BLUES,
http://sitasingstheblues.com/faq.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013); see also Dan Schreiber,
Copyrighting away culture: An interview with Nina Paley, SMILE-POLITELY MAG. (Apr. 9,
2009, 7:00 AM), http://www.smilepolitely.con/arts/copyrighting_awayculture-an_
interview with ninapaley/.
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Measurement costs can be quite high in a copyright context. An
individual copyright is severable in many ways, and multiple copyrights
can be created in the same work. For example, the so-called "movie rights"
to a book can be conveyed as either a license or as a sale. 99 When the movie
rights are sold, the buyer acquires something akin to a fee simple property
interest in the right to make a movie from the book; the buyer is merely
limited by the termination of transfer options and the remaining term of the
copyright. Notably, the buyer can also convey the right again. "Movie
rights" encompass the "big three" aspects of a property right-the right to
exclude, to use, and--crucially- to alienate the right to yet another party.
Movie rights are analogous to the "Monday watch right" that Merrill
and Smith worried about and illustrate their concerns.'0 The term "movie
rights" is roughly shorthand for the right to copy and make a derivative
work of the original, so long as the new work is a movie. (Video game
rights, novelizations, children's books, comic books, stage rights, and rights
to any other form of storytelling can also be severed from a copyright.) But,
even though "movie rights" are roughly shorthand for the right to make a
derivative film, the term "movie rights" is hardly a single "form" of right.
The sale of movie rights might include the right to make sequels, to make
themed merchandise based on the film, or to make further derivative works
based on the movie, such as novelizations. Depending on the form of the
original work, it might include making copies of the original for everyone
who is working on the derivative work. Just like the iTunes and Microsoft
licenses, a document conveying "movie rights" will have many clauses.
The separation of movie rights--and their ability to be reconveyedraises the measurement costs of acquiring intellectual property. Suppose
Ann owns a copyright, and Ben wants to purchase it. Ben must not only
establish that Ann owns the copyright; Ben must also establish that no
pieces of the copyright, such as movie rights, have been severed from
Ann's ownership interests. This might be especially difficult because Ann
will often be able to show all indicia of ownership in the copyright, leaving
Ben with the responsibility to inquire carefully about whether any aspects
of the right have been spun off.
This process gets even more complicated as a copyright, or part thereof,
moves through many owners over a period of decades. The Ninth Circuit
decision, Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A. VE.L.A., Inc.,'01 illustrates how

99. See, e.g., Fields v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 1202 (1950) (finding that a sale of motion
picture rights had been effected); Goldsmith v. Comm'r, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944);
Sabatini v. Comm., 98 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1938) (finding that a motion picture had been
licensed and reversing a lower court's holding that the motion picture rights had been sold);
Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (finding motion picture rights to be
sold).
100. See Merrill & Smith, supranote 1.
101. 654 F.3d 958(9th Cir. 2011).
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conveying copyrights over time via contract increases measurement costs.
Fleischer concerned the copyrights in Betty Boop cartoons, which were
popular in the 1930s. 1°2 Boop's creator, Max Fleischer, sold the rights to the
Betty Boop cartoons and character before dissolving his company, Fleischer
Studios, Inc. (Original Fleischer), in 1946.103 In the 1970s, Max Fleischer's
family got back into the cartoon business, starting a new company named
Fleischer Studios and attempting to buy back the intellectual property rights
in Betty Boop. 0 4
Fleischer Studios began licensing the Betty Boop character for use in
toys, dolls, and other merchandise, and sued A.V.E.L.A., 10 5Inc. and other
parties that were licensing Betty Boop merchandise as well.
Although Fleischer initially suggested many possible chains of title for
copyright in the Betty Boop character, it abandoned all but one possibility
on appeal. 0 6 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Fleischer argued that Original
Fleischer had transferred its rights to Paramount Pictures, Inc. (Paramount)
in 1941, that Paramount transferred those rights to UM & M TV Corp.
(UM & M) in 1955, that UM & M transferred the rights to National
Telefilm Associates, Inc. (NTA) in 1958, that NTA became Republic
Pictures in 1986, and finally, that Republic Pictures transferred the
copyright to Fleischer in 1997.'7
The court found A.V.E.L.A. not liable for copyright infringement of the
Betty Boop character because of a term in the agreement that transferred the
copyright in the Betty Boop cartoons from Paramount to UM & M.10 8 The
purchase agreement stated,
Paramount hereby grants and assigns to [UM & M] all of Paramount's
right, title and interest in and to said Photoplays [of Betty Boop] which are
deliverable by Paramount to [UM & M] hereunder and do not revert to
Paramount under Paragraph 11 hereof, hereinafter for convenience
referred to as "Sold Photoplays", any copyrights subsisting therein, the
literary material upon which they are based and the instruments whereby
Paramount acquired its right, title and interest in and to such literary
material ....
Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, no grant or assignment is
made hereunder to [UM & M] of the characters and characterizations
contained in said Sold Photoplays or said literary material, or of the
copyrights in said characters or characterizations, or of any production or
other rights in said characters and characterizations, or to use said

102. See id. at 960-62.
103. Id. at 961.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 964.
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characters and characterizations or the names of said characters or trade
names, trademark and names of the series of Sold Photoplays or of said
literary material in any manner except.., only as part of theparticular
Sold Photoplay in which they or any of them are contained ....
The purchase agreement between Paramount and UM & M conveyed
the copyrights to the Betty Boop cartoons, but not to her character. 110
Although Fleischer argued strenuously that this could not have been
Paramount's intention, the court found otherwise, noting that "the record
suggests that three years after entering into the UM & M agreement,
Paramount transferred its Betty Boop character copyright to Harvey
Films."' Because UM & M never held the copyright to Betty Boop, it
could not convey it to NTA/Republic Pictures, who in turn could not
convey it to Fleischer."' Fleischer argued that it had acquired the Betty
Boop copyright from Harvey Films in another fashion, but the majority held
that Fleischer had waived that argument when it did not raise the possibility
in its opening brief.' 3 The dissenting judge criticized the majority's
decision to stop its analysis of who owned the Bet Boop character at the
point when Paramount sold the copyright to Harvey.1 4 She wrote,
[A]s a matter of discretion, I would reach the Harvey Films chain of title.
The basic question raised by this appeal is the ownership of the copyright.
I see nothing to be gained, and no unfair advantage to be conferred, by
resolving this issue to the 5present day, rather than arbitrarily stopping our
analysis as of the 1950s. 11
The court did not decide who owned the Betty Boop character,
however, and following the resolution of Fleischer,her character became
an unlikely orphan work. 16
Fleischer illustrates the confusion that can arise from fairly typical
transfers of copyright between parties. Because a character can acquire a
separate copyright from the work the character appears in," 7 it was possible
to separate the title to the character Betty Boop from the title to the cartoon.
This is unlike the "movie rights" situation, where a copyright can be
severed into parts, because there is actually a separate copyright in a

109.
110.

Id. at 963.
Id. at964.

111.
112.

Id. at 964-65.
Id. at 964.

113.

Id. at966.

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 970 (Graber, J., dissenting).
Id.
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character and in a work including the character. However, the Fleischer
situation illustrates the same problem that exists with movie rights. The
transfer between Original Fleischer and Paramount included both the title to
the Betty Boop cartoons and to the Betty Boop character. But when
Paramount got around to selling Betty Boop, it sold only the cartoons.
Decades and several titleholders later, Fleischer believed it was buying
back what Original Fleischer had sold-not realizing that the rights in the
Betty Boop character had been separated.
Because intellectual property rights can be severed and repackaged in
any variety of ways, parties in Fleischer's position have to expend
significant effort to research the ownership history of intellectual property.
The only way for Fleischer to be certain of exactly what it was purchasing
from Republic Pictures would be to trace the sale documents all the way
back through UM & M and Paramount. Because corporations change form
and dissolve and people die and lose records, tracing title over decades will
often be a very difficult endeavor. Fleischer would have had to expend even
more effort to determine the scope of its ownership if one of the transfer
contracts had been imprecise-for example, if one company had transferred
"all its rights" relating to Betty Boop to another company. Fleischer would
then have had to investigate if that company had ever severed part of the
rights in Betty Boop in another document, such as if it had sold movie
rights or video game rights. As a work travels through several owners over
decades, the costs of determining what rights the current owner has to
convey can become prohibitively high. Buyers of valuable works have to
spend significant resources determining what they are purchasing, else they
could end up unable to protect the rights they thought they purchased, as
happened with Fleischer. Even worse, they could end up defending their
use of a copyrighted work that they mistakenly believed they had
purchased.
A recent Note in the Harvard Law Review argued, "Copyrights that are
valuable enough to buy and enforce will likely be owned by sophisticated
commercial entities, which will, under competition, set ownership
structures that converge around the structures that are optimal given works'
underlying features." Merrill and Smith acknowledge that some balance
must be struck between the ease in understanding property rights afforded
by few forms and the frustration of interest that results from there being too
few forms." 9 The Note author claims, based on Merrill and Smith's
observation, that there is no problem with a numerus infinitus principle
because large media companies will carve up copyrights into socially
optimal forms, without the need for courts or legislatures to define them.' 0

118.
119.
120.

Note, supra note 38, at 1767.
Merrill & Smith, supranote 1, at 40.
Note, supra note 38, at 1767.
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This suggestion ignores several critiques of abandoning the numerus
clausus principle articulated by Merrill and Smith, namely that contracting
parties will not internalize the costs of their decisions on third parties, such
as potential future purchasers or those who interact with other property and
who must expend greater effort to determine how that property's interests
are divided.' 2 The Fleischer case illustrates this problem-contracting
parties will not internalize the costs of downstream purchasers. Paramount's
decision to convey only part of its rights to Betty Boop caused confusion
and massive litigation costs for Fleischer. Even if that contract was best for
Paramount and UM & M, their decision to split up the rights in the Betty
Boop cartoons had unintended consequences for Fleischer that certainly
appear to have wasted significant legal resources for the parties in the
Fleischer case. In short, even large corporations face large measurement
costs when trying to purchase copyrights.
C. Difficulty Verifying OwnershipRights
Hansmann and Kraakman's concerns about coordination, enforcement,
and verification of property rights also describe a problem in intellectual
property law. They warned,
The less effectively the parties solve coordination and enforcement
problems, the greater the scope for mistake or opportunism, and hence the
less valuable will be the rights... :the parties may take costly private
actions to protect their rights... and using assets may be
discouraged ....
2
122
The authors could well have been describing the use of digital rights
management technology, which is as well known for frustrating the good
intentions of paying users as it is for preventing unauthorized uses and
copies. In 2010, the gaming company Ubisoft, for example, decided to set
up its games so that the program would have to check in with Ubisoft over
the internet before a user could play the game. 123 Throughout play, the
game would also periodically check in with Ubisoft; if the player had a
poor internet connection or had been kicked offline, the game would abort
after failing to reach Ubisoft.124 Ubisoft's method of "digital rights

121.
122.

Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 45-49.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 382-83.

123.

Ben Kuchera, Ubisoft's New DRM Solution: You Have Be Online to Play, ARs

TECHNICA

(Jan. 27, 2010, 4:11 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2010/01/ubisofts-

new-drm-solution-you-have-be-online-to-play.ars.
124. See Kuchera, supra note 123; Mike Masnick, Ubisoft DRM Gets Worse And
Worse: Kicks You Out of Game If You Have A Flakey WiFi Connection, TECHDIRT (Feb. 18,
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management" would prevent anyone without an internet connection from
playing games (including if, for example, the player was on an airplane),
and even more frustratingly, would ruin the game2 5of anyone who had
briefly lost his or her internet connection during play.1
Ubisoft's DRM was positioned to make gaming a much less valuable
experience for garners who traveled or had flaky internet connections.
Notably, Ubisoft's system was "cracked" almost as soon as it was made
available, making the sale of games much less valuable for Ubisoft as
well. 126 As noted by the blog Techdirt, "Many people ... [said] that while
they would have bought the game otherwise, now they would just wait for a
DRM-free cracked version to show up.' 2 7 At one point, Ubisoft's servers
crashed, preventing anyone from playing its Assassin's Creed 2 game.
Some potential buyers chose not to buy Ubisoft games because of the
annoying digital right management system"9 --as Hansmaan and Kraakman
predicted, use of the property was discouraged by one party's costly
protection methods. As a result, Ubisoft was harmed by its protection
methods as it lost customers it would have otherwise had. Nonetheless,
some other game companies have followed suit; the company Electronic
Arts announced that its game Command and Conquer 4 would require a
constant internet connection to be played as well.1O (In contrast, Blizzard
Entertainment has taken the opposite approach with its World of Warcraft

Pereira, Assassin's Creed 2 on PC Requires a Constant Internet Connection, IUP.coM (Feb.
17,2010), http://www. lup.com/news/assassin-creed-2-requires-constant.
125. See Kuchera, supra note 123.
126. Karl Bode, Ubisoft's Despised DRM Continues to Annoy, Fail, TECHDIRT (Apr.
22, 2010, 4:19 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100421/1103339130.shtml; Mike
Masnick, Ubisoft's Annoying New DRM Cracked Within Hours ofRelease, TECHDIRT (Mar.
4, 2010,7:59 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articies/20100304/1302148421.shtml.
127. Masnick, supra note 126.
128. Mike Masnick, Ubisoft's 'You Must Be Connected To This Server' Annoying
6:12
AM),
8,
2010,
(Mar.
Down,
TECHDIRT
Servers
Go
DRM
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100308/ 0138388459.shtml; Griffin McElroy, Ubisoft
DRM Authentication Server is Down, Assassin's Creed 2 Unplayable, JOYSTIQ (Mar. 7,
2010, 4:00 PM), http:/www.joystiq.com/2010/03/07/ ubisoft-drm-authentification-server-is-

down-assassins-creed-2..
129. Masnick, supra note 126.
130. Mike Masnick, EA To Require Internet Connection for Command & Conquer,
TECHDIRT

(July

17,

2009,

3:38

AM),

http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090716

/0141125564.shtml; Mike Masnick, Despite Plenty of Warning EA Still Decides to Follow
Ubisofi Down The Wrong Path With DRM, TECHDIRT (Mar. 19, 2010, 1:08 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100318/1240028622.shtml; Jim Sterling, Command &
Conquer 4 Requires Constant Online Connection, DESTRUCTOID (Mar. 18, 2010, 8:00 AM),
http://www.destructoid.com/command-conquer-4-requires-constant-online-comnnection168117.phtml.
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game.) 31 These issues are not limited to games. Problems with the digital
rights management technology on Blu-Ray copies of Avatar prevented
many who purchased authentic copies of the film from watching it on their
Blu-Ray players, 132 and a Blu-Ray firmware update
temporarily rendered
33
Warner Brothers and Universal films unwatchable1
Hansmann and Kraakman noted,
Of all verification rules, possession is the most primitive and
commonplace. In theory, verification could be based only on
possession.... The advantages of this system are obvious. It is easy to
understand, cheap to administer, and generally unambiguous. It is, in fact,
reasonably close to the approach taken to most chattels.'13
Unfortunately, possession is all but useless for indicating ownership
rights in intellectual property, since copies of an invention or work are so
commonly acquired without any corresponding rights to make a copy.
Moreover, the scope of individuals' intellectual property rights is not
connected to their possession of particular objects. As Christopher Newman
observes,
To avoid infringing a patent, it is not sufficient to avoid appropriating or
coming into contact with any particular physical objects, whether
possessed by the patent owner or anyone else. This means that regardless
of how "concrete" the conception "boundaries" of the patent are, those
boundaries do not (as they do for tangible property) serve as crude proxies
that obviate the need to identify and evaluate potential uses of physical
resources in order to comply with the property rights of others. To the
contrary, it is only through extremely detailed evaluation of uses that
anyone is able to determine whether or not actions transgress the
"boundaries" of the patent. This35 is as true of the patented machine as it is
of the business-method patent.'
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134. Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 4, at 384-85.
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Hansmann and Kraakman correctly anticipate some of the worst effects
of the numerus infinitus problem on copyright and patent law: people do
not know what rights they have, and they do not know when they are
infringing on another's rights. 136 People are confused not only because the
law is confusing, but also because their rights are so costly to comprehend.
Digital content licenses are too long for users to reasonably read and
absorb. For example, the terms and conditions for using the iTunes store are
eighteen single-spaced pages when printed.137 One would not be surprised
to be told that a vanishingly small number of iTunes users read them. The
usage rules lay out a scheme of finely-honed permissions, specifying what
those who agree to the terms can do with iTunes Plus products, which
include most songs and music videos,138 and with other iTunes products,
such as television episodes and films. Products designated "iTunes Plus"
may only be put to "personal, noncommercial use."' 39 Regular iTunes
products are subject to a more specific set of rules. So-called "purchased"
iTunes products may be placed on five devices at any time. Audio playlists
may be burned seven times, but videos and ringtones may not be burned at
all.'40 The average user neither knows nor has even read this information.

REv. 61, 105-06 (2009) (citing JAMES BESSEN

& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 4772 (2008) (discussing the difficulty of discerning patent boundaries)).
136. Hansmann & Kraakman, supranote 4, at S375, S396.
137. See iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/legal/
itunes/us/terms.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). The iTunes Terms and Conditions are so
lengthy and convoluted that they have become a cultural phenomenon of their own accord.
Recently, actor Richard Dreyfuss recorded a dramatic reading of the iTunes End User
License Agreement for CNET. See Rafe Needleman, Richard Dreyfuss Reads the iTunes
EULA, CNET (June 8, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/8301-30976_1-2006877810348864.html.
APPLE.COM,
138. See
iTunes
Plus
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://support.apple.com/kb/HTl711 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) ("iTunes Plus downloads
are songs and music videos available in our highest quality 256 kbps AAC audio encoding
(twice the audio quality of protected music purchases), and without digital rights
management (DRM)."); see also Erica Sadun, Apple, labels both win with DRM-free iTunes,
tiered pricing, ARs TECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/appletnews/2009/
01/apple-labels-both-win-with-drm-free-itunes-tiered-pricing.ars (describing the launch of
iTunes Plus).
139. See iTunes Store Terms and Conditions, supra note 137, Section B ("USAGE
RULES (i) You shall be authorized to use Products only for personal, noncommercial
use.... (vi) iTunes Plus Products do not contain security technology that limits your usage
of such Products, and Usage Rules (ii) - (v) do not apply to iTunes Plus Products. You may
copy, store, and bum iTunes Plus Products as reasonably necessary for personal,
noncommercial use.").
140. Id. ("USAGE RULES ...(ii) You shall be authorized to use Products on five
Apple-authorized devices at any time, except for Content Rentals ....(iv) You shall be
authorized to burn an audio playlist up to seven times. (v) You shall not be entitled to bum
video Products or ringtone Products.").
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The software licenses for Microsoft Office 2010 are even more
particular. A "Home and Student" edition of Microsoft Office software
under a retail license can be installed "on up to three licensed devices in [a]
household for use by people for whom that is their primary residence" but
"may not be used for commercial, nonprofit, or revenue-generating
activities.""" Apparently, under the Microsoft 2010 retail license, the Home
and Student edition of Microsoft Word is not licensed for use by one's
houseguests.
That each license is different contributes to the confusion, causing
intellectual property owners to erect expensive fences to maintain the
property "boundaries" they desire. In sum, both buyer and seller experience
loss, from underuse of property and overinvestment in fences, respectively.
VI. POSSIBILITIES FOR NUMERUS CLAUSUS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
POCKETS OF STANDARDIZATION

The above examples lead to the difficult question of what forms make
sense in intellectual property. Merrill and Smith postulate that there is some
optimal number of forms, enough to allow property owners the flexibility to
effect their desired ends, but not so many as to make transaction costs
intolerably high. 142 "From a social point of view, the objective would be to
minimize the sum of measurement (and error) costs, frustration costs, and
administrative costs. In other words, what we want is not maximal
standardization--or no standardization-but optimal standardization.' 43
Merrill and Smith observe that neither "total freedom of customization" nor
"complete regimentation.., is likely to minimize social costs."'144 But
unfortunately they give us no guidance as to how many forms are likely to
be appropriate or what the characteristics of a beneficial form would be.
Imposing forms could also create difficulties for those used to
transacting in their absence. Because intellectual property has been freely
customizable, intellectual property owners have grown accustomed to being
able to license their works in highly idiosyncratic ways. Transitioning to a
different system could be difficult, depending on how limited the permitted
forms were.
Frustration costs must be balanced against the many benefits of
standardization. In industries or practices where frustration costs would be
very high, or where the benefits of standardization would be low, creating
intellectual property forms might have a net deleterious effect. But in areas
that seem particularly problematic, where there is great confusion about
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ownership rights and prohibitions on conveyance, we might want to fold
aspects of the numerus clausus principle into intellectual property
jurisprudence.
In effect, the numerus clausus principle could be active in particular
"pockets" of the intellectual property legal landscape-local areas where
the social costs of infinitely customizable property rights are higher than the
costs of standardized property rights.
This part includes several suggestions of areas where standardization
could be beneficial, and discussion of several areas where caution in
changing the law is likely to be more appropriate. It is divided into two
sections: one section concerning the exclusive rights conferred by the patent
and copyright statutes-in particular, the right to make copies-and the
other section concerning rights to use and convey particularcopies of a
protected work or invention.
A. Local Numerus ClaususPrinciplesfor Copying Rights
1. Exhaustion of Derivative Work Rights
One particularly knotty area of copyright law is the licensing or sale of
a work for use in a new work. The new work can incorporate the original in
large or small part. For example, one can sell or license movie rights to a
book, in which case the resulting movie will often replicate the plot and
characters of the book very closely. Or, one can license a music clip to be in
the background of a film or television show, in which case the clip will only
constitute a small element of the new work.
These situations can result in a tragedy of the anticommons and
confusion about the scope of the derivative or new work owner's rights. For
example, suppose Ann licenses -the movie rights to her bestselling novel to
Ben. Ben releases the film to domestic theaters. Later, Ben wants to sell his
rights to the film to Carl. Carl wants to release the film on DVD and allow
airlines to show it on long flights.
Depending on what Ann and Ben agreed to, Carl may or may not be
able to release the film on DVD without Ann's permission. If there are
many Anns-in other words, if multiple original works were incorporated
into Ben's movie-Carl could be in for some difficult negotiations as he
tries to acquire everyone's permission to re-release the film in a new
format. Carl could also find himself defending a lawsuit if he
misunderstood the scope of Ben's interests and did something with the film
that Ann had the right to veto.
This situation would be ameliorated if Ann's interests in Ben's movie
were exhausted at the time Ben distributed the film. This exhaustion rule
would hold that, once the deal was signed and the film released to the
public, Ben would have title free and clear to distribute and display the film
in any way he saw fit. If Ben realized that everyone was using a new
technology to watch films, he would always be able to distribute the film in
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that medium. By deeming Ann's interests to be exhausted after the
derivative work is created, Ann (or multiple Ans) could not hold Ben over
a barrel if it became beneficial to use the derivative work in an
unanticipated way. Ben would have title to the movie free and clear and the
freedom to put it to its highest valued uses.
The derivative work exhaustion principle is limited in scope. The rule
would only require that an original author's interest in a derivative work be
exhausted at the time the derivative work is first published, displayed, or
performed. Once the work becomes public, the original author would not be
able to veto its use. However, if an original author had contracted for a
"final cut" of the derivative work, the initial distribution of the derivative
work without her approval would constitute copyright infringement.
Original authors would still be able to write contracts with derivative
work authors concerning the derivative work. For example, Ann could have
contracted with Ben for a certain percentage of all DVD and ticket sales for
some number of years, in exchange for the derivative work sale of her
book. If Ben failed to pay Ann, he would be in breach of contract. But Ben
would not be infringing Ann's copyright interest in the derivative work
because that interest would have already been exhausted.
Original authors would also maintain control over other derivative
works that copy from their original works. Consider Ann, Ben, and Carl
again. Carl wants to make a comic book of Ben's movie. Because the comic
book would be copying both the plot of Ben's film and Ann's book, Carl
would need the agreement of both Ben and Ann to write the comic book.
This distinction between Ann's interests in Ben's derivative work and
in future works derived from Ben's work is already instantiated in the
termination of transfer rules-the aspect of copyright law that allows an
original copyright owner to terminate others' interests in the copyrighted
work and have those interests revert to the original owner.' 45 To illustrate,
suppose Ann had sold the copyright in her book to Ben outright, and he
made a movie based on the book. Because of the termination of transfer
option, several decades later Ann could reclaim her entire copyright interest
in the book. However, although Ann could reclaim her entire copyright
interest in the book, the copyright statute prevents her from blocking the
distribution of Ben's derivative film. The statute provides,
A derivative work prepared under the authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after
its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after
the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work covered by the terminated grant.146

145.
146.

See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 203(bXl) (2006).
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After termination of transfer, Ben would still be able to distribute his
film, but if Carl wanted to make a new comic book that copied from both
the movie and book, he would need to negotiate a license with both Ann
and Ben. This would also be the model for the proposed exhaustion
principle.
In summary, untangling the complex legal relationship a derivative
work can have with original works would return the law to a simpler state
that existed historically. In 1790, derivative works were not covered by the
copyright statute, and the reproduction right was not read so broadly as to
include derivative works in the idea of copying. 47 The author of an
adaptation had rights to a derivative work that were not "intertwined" with
the original. 48 Now, authors of derivative works own the aspects they
contribute, but can exploit the derivative work "only to the extent
authorized by the copyright holder."' 49 Thus "derivative works [are]
potentially subject to the control of multiple owners"' 50 and are particularly
vulnerable to anticommons problems. The exhaustion of an original
author's interest in a derivative work would simplify ownership interests in
derivative, copyrighted works and promote the values advanced by the
numerus clausus principle.
2. Indivisibility of Copyrights
The most blatant incorporation of the numerus clausus principle into
intellectual property law would be to restore the copyright indivisibility
doctrine for all exclusive rights in a copyright. The Copyright Act of 1909
was interpreted to disallow the fragmentation of a copyright into its
component sticks-to copy, to perform, to distribute, etc.' Grants of less
than a full transfer of the undivided copyright were treated as licenses rather
than assignments.15 2 The Copyright Act of 1976 abandoned this policy and
expressly provided that:
[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any
subdivision of any of the rights specified in [17 U.S.C. § 106], may be
transferred... and owned separately. The owner of any particular

147.

Van Houweling, supra note 76, at 609-10.

148.

Id. at 610.

149.

Id.

150.

Id.

151. Lemley, supra note 76, at 569.
152. Id. at 569 (citing Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co. Inc., 282 F. 9, 10 (2d Cir. 1922); 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 10.01[A] n.10).
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exclusive right isentitled, to the extent of that right, to all of
53the protection
and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.1
Under this provision, an exclusive license "operates to transfer that
portion of the copyright to the exclusive licensee." Exclusive rights are
not limited to the six rights listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106; even "a subset of one
of the exclusive rights, such as the exclusive right to publish copies of a
book in hardcover form" can be transferred.' 5 - Exclusive rights can be
"subdivided indefinitely and.., each
156subdivision of an exclusive right may
be owned and enforced separately.'
The benefit of indivisibility is that one entity or group would hold all
the exclusive rights over a work-for example, the rights to reproduce and
perform. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling explains, "The indivisibility rule
aimed to avoid fragmentation that would complicate the task of defending
against lawsuits and avoiding lawsuits by negotiating for permission to use
copyrighted works upfront.",157 Nimmer similarly explains, "The purpose
of... indivisibility was to protect alleged infringers from the harassment of
successive law suits.,,' 5 8 Former register of copyrights Abraham Kaminstein
also observes along this line, "From the viewpoint of ease of tracing title
his
and purposes of suit, it is much simpler
59 to require that only the author or
assignee can control the copyright.",
Mark Lemley worried about divided copyrights and the internet in his
1997 article Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet

60

He

concluded that posting a work on the internet had the potential to infringe
on several of copyright's exclusive rights, including the reproduction right,
the distribution right, and the display right. If these rights were divided
among several parties, the posting individual could be
liable for infringement to several different entities, each of which will
claim the exclusive right to authorize the same conduct.... [E]ven
obtaining a license from the owner of the public display right will not

153. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006).
154. Lemley, supra note 76, at 570.
155. Id.
156. H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 53, 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5674 (cited in Lemley, supra note 76, at 570); 3 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 76, at
§ 10.02[A] (cited in Lemley, supra note 76, at 570).
157. Van Houweling, supra note 76, at 601 (citing Lemley, supra note 76, at 569-72
(noting the difficulties associated with obtaining permission to use divided copyrights when
one activity implicates several owners' rights)).
158. 3 NIMMER &NIMMER, supra note 76, at § 10.01[A] (cited in Van Houweling,
supra note 76, at 601).
159.
REvisioN

160.

STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY ON COPYRIGHT LAW

11 (Comm. Print 1960).
See Lemley, supra note 76.
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permit the licensee to display the work on the Net, since such a display
also makes copies and involves distribution
of the work, and those rights
6

may be owned by different parties.1 1

Indivisibility would simplify licensing issues and make it easier to
identify copyright holders and to determine what rights with respect to a
given copyright they own. But not everyone views indivisibility as a net
benefit. Nimmer criticized the indivisibility doctrine as an unjustifiable
restraint on commerce that "produced technical pitfalls for both buyers and
sellers.' 62 More recently, a Harvard Law Review Note on fragmentation of
copyrights asserted that copyright owners are "better incentivized to

maximize their works' value by
not only have superior expertise
the works' value, but also are
informational and technological

crafting efficient structures .... Owners
in their works and incentive to maximize
better able to respond expeditiously to
changes affecting their works' use.' 63

Nonetheless, the note author agrees that "the balance between anticommons
costs and fiustration costs would be an empirical question."' 64 Although the
note author believes that owners are better suited to fragmenting copyrights
than legislatures or courts, the evidence for this is scant. Moreover, owners
are unlikely to be well-suited, by definition, to considering the negative
externalities of fragmentation. The author asserts, "Copyrights that are
valuable enough to buy and enforce will likely be owned by sophisticated
commercial entities, which will, under competition, set ownership
structures that converge around the structures that are optimal given works'
underlying features.' 65 But the Fleischer case shows that even
"sophisticated commercial entities" can err. Fleischer illustrates how
divided property rights in a work can create confusion among later rightsholders, even when all the rights-holders are precisely the "sophisticated
commercial entities" that the note author anticipates would be apt at
handling rights fragmentation. 1
But the Fleischercase is only one data point of fragmentation. While
confusing and transfer-limiting terms of use are now omnipresent, the
evidence that divisibility of exclusive rights creates net harms is less
apparent. This may be in part because Fleischer-like situations are less
visible. Although terms of use are frequently encountered, contracts

161. Id.at 571.
162. 3 NIMMER & NnwuvmR, supra note 76, at § 10.01[A] (cited in Van Houweling,
supra note 76, at 609).
163. Note, supra note 38, at 1759-60.
164. Id.at 1770.
165. Id. at 1767.
166. See generally Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir.
2011).
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between private parties that fragment copyrights are only visible when they
end up in court.
More research is needed to establish whether copyright fragmentation
tends to have a net positive or negative effect. Nonetheless, the picture
Lemley paints is one with tremendous potential for negative consequences,
and most benefits from fragmentation could be achieved through contract.
For example, suppose an author today would have sold the rights to publish
her book to a publisher, while retaining the rest of the copyright. Without
fragmentation, the author could write a contract granting a license for
someone to publish her book and agreeing not to license the right to publish
the book to anyone else. If the author then breached the contract by
allowing a third party to publish the book, the original publisher could sue
the author for breach of contract. However, no copyright violation would
have occurred because the author still retained her indivisible copyright,
would
and thus any copies
167 of the book printed by the third-party publisher
not be infringing.
3. Public Licenses
A final subject which touches on both the issues relevant to terms of
use and copyright divisibility is public licensing. With a public license, a
copyright owner creates or chooses a blanket license for a work, allowing
anyone to use the work according to the terms. Public software licenses
typically allow anyone to use and build on a licensed work, so long as new
versions include access to the source code for the program."' Public
licenses designed for works such as prose or art, like the Creative

167. In contrast to copyrights, patents still retain some aspects of indivisibility,
although whether one has title to a patent or a license to practice a patent is mainly relevant
for determining standing in patent lawsuits. The Federal Circuit's decision in Rite-Hite Corp.
v. Kelley Co. summarized the principle:
A conveyance of legal title by the patentee can be made only of the entire patent,
an undivided part or share of the entire patent, or all rights under the patent in a
specified geographical region of the United States. A transfer of any of these is an
assignment and vests the assignee with title in the patent, and a right to sue
infringers. A transfer of less than one of these three interests is a license, not an
assignment of legal title, and it gives the licensee no right to sue for infringement
at law in the licensee's own name.
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The right to sue
patent infringers notwithstanding, patent indivisibility does not restrict the ways in which
one can hold and exercise patent rights.
168. See, e.g., General Public License v. 3 § 6, GNU, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/
gpl.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013); Artistic License 2.0 § 5, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE,
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/artistic-license-2.0 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
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Commons license, 169 can permit others to copy the work so long as they
comply with certain terms as well, such as giving attribution to the author,
not using the work for commercial purposes without additional permission,
or not creating derivative works.i70 Software licensed under public licenses
includes the GNU/Linux operating system, the Perl programming language,
the Apache web server programs, and the Firefox web browser." I Creative
Commons estimates that there are close to 100,000,000 works licensed
under various Creative Commons licenses. 172 As the Federal Circuit has

noted,
There are substantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the creation
and distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses .... For
example, program creators may generate market share for their programs
by providing certain components free of charge. Similarly, a programmer
or company may increase its national or international reputation by
incubating open source projects. Improvement to a product can 'come
rapidly and free of charge from an expert not even known to the copyright
holder.173
Additionally, many contributors to open source projects do so because
they are philosophically committed to releasing software that can be
tinkered with and built upon by others, for the public's benefit.
Public licenses represent a bit of a puzzle. On one hand, public licenses
resemble terms of use. On the other hand, unlike most terms of use, they are
not terms concerning particularcopies of a work, but all copies of a work.
Moreover, public licenses are typically written to make alienability and
sharing of particular copies easier, albeit subject to particular conditions174
While licensing conditions typically limit the alienability and identifiability
of property, public licenses are designed with the very purpose of
increasing a work's ability to be shared.
Despite this purpose, public licenses can be problematic when they are

incompatible with one another. For example, under the terms of the Free
Software Foundation's General Public License (GPL) and the Apache
Software Foundation's Apache License, software licensed under GPL v.3
cannot be included in projects that would otherwise be licensed under the

169.

See generally CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Feb.

11,2013).
170. See About The Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
171. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
172. Id.
173. Id.
at 1379.
174. Id. at 1381-83.
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and
Apache License 2.0, and software licensed under the Apache License
75
the GPL v.2 cannot be combined under either license agreement.1
At first blush, license incompatibility makes public licenses appear
offensive to the values at the heart of the numerus clausus principle because
the licenses can make property difficult to use. But incompatibility is not
necessarily an insurmountable problem. Most public software licenses are
"non-exclusive," in the sense that authors of the software code can "grant
particular users greater rights than are contained in the standard form
license.' 76 Of course, many publicly licensed software projects have very
large numbers of contributors, and as a result, seeking copyright permission
from every contributor is effectively impossible. However, when a
company or other organized group spearheads a specific project, it could be
in a position to license its version of the work to others under different
terms.
As to the publicly licensed works with many contributors, the license is
a double-edged sword. Although making legal, off-license use of publicly
licensed works is nearly impossible because of its many contributors,
software with many contributors would also be substantially less likely to
exist without public licenses like the GPL. The GPL and similar licenses
give contributors the means and protection to tinker with software whose
source code might otherwise be concealed or whose copyright status would
otherwise be unclear.
As a matter of policy, public licenses should be permitted because, on
balance, they tend to promote the same values as the numerus clausus
principle. Despite the fact that public licenses impose obligations on users
who wish to copy works, these obligations exist primarily to provide notice
of the work's status, to facilitate alienability, and to allow future users to
tinker with the licensed work-indeed to provide more latitude to users
than copyright law generally allows. Providing notice of the rights
associated with a work helps mitigate the concerns of Merrill and Smith
(although they maintained that notice was not a sufficient substitute for the
numerus clausus principle).177 And concerns about incompatible licenses

175.

Apache License v.2.0 and GPL Compatibility, THE APACHE SOFTWARE
http://www.apache.org/licenses/GPL-compatibility.html (last visited Feb. 11,

FOUNDATION,

2013).
176.

David McGowan, Legal Aspects of Free and Open Source Software, in

PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SoFrwARE 361, 367 (Feller et al. eds., 2005);

see e.g., General Public License v. 3, supra note 168, § 7; Apache License v. 2.0 § 4, THE
APACHE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, http://www.apache.orgtlicenses/LICENSE-2.0 (last visited
Feb. 11,2013).
177. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1,at 43-45 (discussing how notice can be
beneficial but is not sufficient to eliminate the costs of property fragmentation to thirdparties); Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 850 (discussing notice systems in quasi in rem
cases).
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and the difficulty of locating copyright holders can be mitigated by other
means, such as fair use, or a sui generis solution.
Three limits should apply to public licenses, however, in order to make
rights clear and facilitate the conveyance of copies. First, users should have,
at least, unlimited personal use rights to their copy of the licensed work and
the right to reconvey the work under the same terms. Second, conveyed
copies covered by a public license must be coupled with notice of the
license, unless the license dedicates the entire work to the public domain
(i.e., reserving no rights to the creator and imposing no obligations on
users).' 78 Third, public licenses should be nonexclusive to allow for some
future flexibility in how works are used.
Allowing public licenses, subject to the above limitations, will likely
provide a public benefit despite the absence of a numerus clausus principle.
Because a notice of rights must appear on the licenses, the main social costs
imposed by public licensing are the efforts expended to understand the
scope of the license and those that stem from incompatibility. But because
these licenses tend to grant significantly more freedom than copyright law
alone does, users who simply want to use a work for their own personal use
will rarely have to expend much effort to determine the exact contours of
the license. Only when contemplating distributing the work again, or the
creation of a derivative work, would the license need to be scrutinized.
Moreover, separate aims of intellectual property law are advanced by
the use of public licenses. The Constitution permits intellectual property
laws to be erected for the benefit of the public. If intellectual property
owners choose to grant more rights to the public than they need to, the
public's benefit from a work is increased because it has greater access or
has to pay less for access. Because the work is already created, we know
that the intellectual property owner was already sufficiently incentivized to
create the work, and we know that the intellectual property owner would
prefer to release the work with greater freedoms for those who might come
in contact with it. Accordingly, for both the public and the intellectual
property owner, the world in which public licenses are permitted is
beneficial, especially because measurement costs will be lower when a
notice of property rights is present and when all users are granted personal
use rights.

178. If the notice would be cumbersome to include due to the medium, a link to a
website or similar shorthand notice would be acceptable.

2013]

MULLIGAN

B. Local Numerus Clausus Principlesfor Rights Involving Copies
1. A Digital First Sale Doctrine
Much confusion about the scope of one's ownership rights and concern
about restraints on the alienation of property arise from the legal treatment
of digital works and software. Because of the nature of digital works and
the MAI Systems holding,179 traditional notions of a single copy are
tremendously unhelpful in a digital context. To illustrate, compare a book
and an eBook. When Ann takes her book from home to work or to the
beach, she carries a single copy of the book with her. However, Ann cannot
do the same with a single copy of an eBook. When she turns on the desktop
computer in her home and opens a pdf copy of the eBook, a copy of the
book is made in her computer's RAM memory. If she wants to take the
book to the beach, she must load it onto a portable e-reader, making another
copy. If she wants to read the book on her work computer, she might copy
the eBook onto a USB key and then copy it again from the USB key to her
office computer. Many commentators argue that platform-shifting and
personal uses such as these are fair uses of copyrighted works, 80 although
the extent to which these are fair uses is untested.
Content providers have responded to the necessity of making multiple
copies of a digital work by drafting increasingly complex licensing
agreements for use of digital content, such as the licenses for iTunes,
Microsoft Office, and the Amazon Kindle. Sometimes these licenses grant
users "personal use" rights to a work, whereas others specify a particular
number of computers or devices the work may be copied onto.
These license agreements bump up against Hansmann and Kraakman's
concern. 8 'I Verification of one's rights to copyrighted content is very costly
when licenses are long and detailed. Users not only do not read terms of use
agreements, but realistically cannot read them. Economists have estimated
that individuals who read every privacy policy they agree to online would
each spend about 244 hours per year, or forty-two minutes a day, reading
policies.18 2 Lengthy licenses for software or use of digital content would

179. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518.
180. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, UnbundlingFair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2537,
2592 (2009); Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have to Give
Notice of Their Use of Technical ProtectionMeasures?, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
41, 44 (2007); see also In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting spaceshifting as a possible fair use); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys.,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) ([S]pace-shift copying "is [a] paradigmatic

noncommercial personal use.").
181. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
182. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, I/S: A JouRNAL OF LAW & POL'Y FOR THE INFO. Soc'Y, 2008 Privacy Year in
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similarly take an inordinate and unrealistic amount of time to read. Even
Chief Justice John Roberts admits he does not read End User License
Agreements (EULAs).18 3 Rather than read a license, a purchaser is more
likely to simply make a rough guess about what uses are allowed and
forbidden. Because digital content and software are relatively inexpensive,
and few infringements are caught, purchasers do not have the incentives to
learn precisely what they are agreeing to. A user of iTunes would
reasonably guess that she should not put a purchased music track on a filesharing website, but probably does not know whether she can burn six,
seven, or eight copies of a particular playlist.
Lengthy, idiosyncratic licenses to use digital content do not work. The
numerus clausus principle could significantly benefit this area of
intellectual property law by eliminating the licensing of copies of digital
works and software and replacing them with "digital sales."
Digital sales would work similarly to sales of chattels. A primary
benefit of the "digital sale" form is that it would align rights in digital goods
with existing consumer expectations in the physical objects all around
them. Currently, physical copies of books and CDs are sold, not licensed, to
readers and listeners. Since the Bobbs-Merrill case in 1908,'84 copyright
owners have not been able to tie use restrictions to particular copies of
copyrighted works. Similarly, owners of digital content would not have the
option to grant indefinite licenses to merely use a work. Copies could be
reconveyed to others so long as the prior owner deleted his copy.
The scope of a digital copy owner's rights will deviate somewhat from
the rights of a chattel owner because multiple copies are necessarily made
when digital copies are used. A digital sale would ideally grant the copy's
owner the right to make as many copies as necessary for the owner's
personal uses, so long as only one computer or device was used to display
or perform the work at any given time. This right would allow a copy's

Review issue, at 17, available at http://www.aleecia.com/authors-drafts/readingPolicyCostAV.pdf; see also Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and ConceptualImplications ofBiological
"Lock-Out" Systems, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1553, 1584 (2004) ("The inability of the general

public to track all the myriad permutations of mass market licenses is well illustrated by the
frequent appearance of outrageous terms in such contracts[,] ... including provisions that
forbid criticism of the product or ... conferring... upon the publisher of web page design
software a right in the web pages designed using the software purchased.").
183. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn't Read the
Fine
Print, ABA
JouRNAL,
Oct.
20,
2010, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chiefjustice-robertsadmits-he-doesnt-read-the
computerfineprintl; Mike Masnick, Supreme Court ChiefJustice Admits He Doesn't Read
Online EULAs Or Other 'Fine Print', TECHDIRT (Oct. 22, 2010, 9:48 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articIes/20101021/02145811519/suprene-court-chief-justiceadmits-he-doesn-t-read-online-eulas-or-other-fine-print.shtml.
184. Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
Computer
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owner to do everything she could do with a physical copy of a work, and
still permit someone's houseguest to briefly use Microsoft Word or look at
the first chapter of a highly recommended eBook without violating a
copyright.
Lending could be preserved in one of two ways. First, an owner could
forward a copy of a work to another and delete the copies on his own
computer or devices until it was sent back. Second, a copyright owner could
sell copies that are burdened with digital rights management technology and
that effectively "self-destruct" after a period of time. Movies can currently
be rented in iTunes in this fashion. However, a copyright owner should not
be able to circumvent the requirements of a digital sale by lending works
for very long periods of time or repeatedly relending a work.
a. History and Objections
Variations on the idea of a digital first sale doctrine have been under
consideration in Congress several times, albeit in slightly different forms.
Bills in the House of Representatives proposed digital first sale doctrines in
1997 and 2003. I85 These bills adopted the idea that "forwarding and
deleting" digital content was sufficient to avoid copyright liability and to
legally transfer a copy from one individual to another.1 6 The proposed
2003 Balance Act provided, "The privileges prescribed by [the first sale
doctrine] apply in a case in which the owner of a particular copy.., of a
work in a digital or other nonanalog format.., sells or otherwise disposes
of the work by means of a transmission to a single recipient, if the owner
does not retain the copy .... ,,1 17 Reports from the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration and the Copyright
Office also wrestled with the idea of whether to allow a digital first sale
doctrine when coupled with digital rights management technology that
ensured the deletion of a forwarded work.' 8

185. See Balance Act, H.R.1066, 108th Cong. (2003), discussedin Henry Sprott Long
III, Note, Reconsidering the 'Balance' of the 'Digital First Sale' Debate: Re-examining the
Case for a Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine to Facilitate Second-Hand Digital Media
Markets, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1195-98 (2008); Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act,
H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997).
186. Long, supra note 185, at 1196.
187. H.R. 1066, supra note 185.
188. See NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: STUDY
EXAMINING 17 U.S.C. SEcTIONS 109 AND 117 PURSUANT TO SECTION 104 OF THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/
2001/report-congress-study-examining-17-usc-sections-109-and-1 17-pursuant-section-104digital; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO
§ 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 130-48 (2001), available at

http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1 .pdf

(hereinafter

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 80:235

Historically, when "forward and delete" proposals have been suggested,
copyright holders have "expressed concern that the power to alienate
digitally distributed copies will lead to consumers gaming the system by
keeping a copy after purporting to alienate their interest in it."' 89 Concerns
with forward-and-delete must be viewed in light of the reality that, although
there is no digital first sale doctrine now, individuals frequently share
digital content among small groups of friends without deleting it from their
own computers. Indeed, according to a leaked presentation from the
Recording Industry Association of America, seventy percent of music
"piracy" in 2011 occurred offline, rather than using peer-to-peer filesharing programs or digital lockers. 9° Accordingly, allowing individuals
who wish to act within the confines of the law to forward-and-delete will
not encourage illegal copying because those who want to share works
among small groups of friends already do so.
The more important question is whether a digital first sale doctrine
would give legal cover to large-scale file-sharing. Under the Supreme
Court's Grokster decision, 19' content-owners need not fear that a digital
first sale doctrine will provide cover for piracy.
A secondary music market would be most open to the kind of
infringement charge that brought down Grokster-where the transfer
facilitator clearly encouraged infringement, despite the transfer platform
having a substantial non-infiinging use. 9 2 A secondary music market that
wanted to actually sell and gift music, instead of facilitating the making of
multiple copies, could actively take precautions to prevent the sharing of
multiple copies of a song in order to avoid accusations of inducing
infringement. 93

REPORT OF THE REGISTER).

189. Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 82, at 938 (citing REPORT OF THE REGISTER,
supra note 188, at 47-48). "Note that this worry is nothing new, as consumers have always
been able to copy their LPs, cassettes, or CDs before reselling them on the secondary
market." Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 82, at 938 n.273.
190.

RIAA: Online Music Piracy Pales in Comparison to Offline Swapping,

(July 26, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/riaa-online-music-piracy-pales-incomparison-to-offline-swapping-120726. According to the presentation, in 2011,
TORRENTFREAK

approximately 70% of unpaid music came from offline swapping, compared with 30%
acquired from peer-to-peer file sharing and digital lockers. Interms of all music, in 2011,
16% of music was acquired by paying for physical CDs, 19% through paid downloads, 15%

through peer-to-peer file sharing, 4% through digital lockers, 19% through hard-drive
trading, and 27% through burning or ripping music from others. Id.
191. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
192. See id. at 922, 934-37.
193. For example, a centralized secondary seller could limit an account to selling one
copy of a work and compare the content of previously sold works to newly uploaded ones to
make sure a filename was not simply changed. Each account might be tied to a unique credit
or debit card, to prevent a person from having unlimited numbers of accounts. The central
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Finally, variations on a "digital first sale doctrine" already exist in
particular proprietary software programs, and no harm has resulted. Apple's

iTunes software allows a party to make a one-time transfer of the software
license rights to a third party. 194 Microsoft licenses also allow a one-time

transfer of rights in its software as long as the original software owner
deletes her copy. 9 5 Although Microsoft employs other mechanisms to

ensure that its copies are authorized, this provision of its license reveals that
Microsoft is somewhat comfortable with the existence of a secondary
market in software.
b. Additional Benefits of a DigitalFirstSale Doctrine
The ability to legally transfer copies provides many public benefits in

addition to those typically associated with property alienation. As
R. Anthony Reese concisely observes,
If every used bookstore, video rental store, and library in the United States
had to locate and negotiate with the copyright owner of every title they

market could use technology to look for accounts that have sold substantially similar music
files and compare identifying information of the accounts to evaluate whether or not the
account holders are the same person. Finally, the uploading software could include a
forward-and-delete style software that deletes a file when it is uploaded to the file-selling
clearing house.
194. See iTunes License, at § 3 (Revised Sept. 23, 2011), http://images.apple.com/
iegal/sla/docs/iTunes.pdf ("You may not rent, lease, lend, redistribute or sublicense the
Apple Software. You may, however, make a one-time permanent transfer of all of your
license rights to the Apple Software to another party, provided that: (a) the transfer must
include all of the Apple Software, including all its component parts, original media (if any),
printed materials and this License; (b) you do not retain any copies of the Apple Software,
full or partial, including copies stored on a computer or other storage device; and (c) the
party receiving the Apple Software reads and agrees to accept the terms and conditions of
this License.") (cited in Long, supra note 185, at 1195).
195. See Microsoft Software License Terms for Microsoft Office 2010, supra note 88,
at § 20. The license provides,
TRANSFER TO A THIRD PARTY. The first user of the software may make a
one-time transfer of the software and this agreement, by transferring the genuine
proof of license directly to a third party. The first user must remove the software
before transferring it separately from the licensed device. The first user may not
retain any copies of the software. Before any permitted transfer, the other party
must agree that this agreement applies to the transfer and use of the software. If the
software is an upgrade, any transfer must also include all prior versions of the
software.
Id. (similar license version cited and discussed in Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual
Worlds Can Do For Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159, 198 (2010)).
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wished to resell, rent, or lend, and had to remit compensation to the
copyright owner for each resale, rental, or loan, many fewer such
transactions would likely take place, and the prices charged in those
transactions that did occur would be higher than under the first sale
doctrine to offset transaction costs.'
The first sale doctrine benefits society when works go out of print or
are no longer sold, when copyright owners withdraw or suppress the work,
or when a work is withdrawn from the market to create false scarcity. 9 7 The
first sale doctrine also creates the positive externality of increasing the
likelihood that copyrighted works will be preserved and accessible for
future generations.?8 Digital works have greater hurdles to preservation
than analog or physical copies of works; in addition to preserving a copy
and translating the language, "digital translation" presents an additional
problem. 99 Most digital works interact with other programs on a computer,
and maintaining compatibility and usability over time can be particularly
challenging.
First sale allows for repeated migration of a work across platforms and
increases the likelihood that it will persist over a period of time. 200 Illegal
"abandonware" projects illustrate how hobbyists and computer game
enthusiasts work to prevent classic computer games that are no longer for
sale from becoming lost or unusable.2 01 The efforts to preserve old

196. R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C. L. REv. 577, 592 (2003).
197. See id. at 633.
198. Id. at 604.
199. "[W]ithout some sort of digital resuscitation, every application [program] ...
eventually stops working, and every data file eventually becomes unreadable. Every
application and every file." Claire Tristram, Data Extinction, TECH. REv., Oct. 2002, at 39,
available at http://www.technologyreview.com/communications/12975/ (quoted in Reese,
supra note 196, at 639).
200. If there are many copies of a work in a variety of locations, there is a statistically
greater chance the work will survive over time. As Reese explained, if there is one copy of a
work with a 1/100 chance of being destroyed in a given year, there is only a 13% chance it
will still exist in two hundred years. Whereas, if there are 100 copies, the chance that at least
one copy will survive in a hundred years is 99.9999944%. Reese, supra note 196, at 605-06.
201. See, e.g., ABANDONIA, http://www.abandonia.com/en/gameall/Abandonware (last
visited Feb. 11, 2013); HOME OF THE UNDERDOGS, http://www.hotud.org/ (last visited Feb.
11, 2013). An abandonware webring defines abandonware as:
any PC or console game that is... [alt least four years old [and] [n]ot being sold
or supported by the company that produced it or by any other company. When a
certain piece of [a]bandonware is later found to be sold or supported by a
company, then it ceases to be [a]bandonware.
THE OFFICIAL ABANDONWARE WEBRING,

http://www.abandonwarering.con/?Page=FAQ# l A
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computer games evoke the fate of many films from the 1920s. For many
years, film companies did not believe it was economically worthwhile to
preserve old films, and because they owned all the copies, many3films were
treasure. M
lost.20 2 Yet, today, we consider the films that remain a

The Copyright Act acknowledges the value of archival, but allows only
very limited copying towards that end. Section 108(c) of the 1976
Copyright Act permits libraries to reproduce up to three copies of a
published work "solely for the purpose of replacement of a copy or
phonorecord that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if the existing
This
format in which the work is stored has become obsolete. .
provision is not enough to preserve the usability of obsolete digital works.
Not only must more parties be permitted to archive, but more copies must
be legally archivable. Many libraries do not keep copies of software, video
games, and computer games. And yet, these games are as important to the
".."'04

culture of the past few decades as written fairy tales were generations
earlier.20 5 "Preserving old computer games isn't about sentimentality or

(last visited Feb. 11, 2013). Although purveyors of abandonware are committing copyright
infringement, they consider their work noble because without their work, the games would
likely become permanently lost to everyone. "Preserving old computer games isn't about
sentimentality or retro trendiness or collectibility," said Richard Carlson, a game developer
at Rogue Entertainment, in an e-mail message. "It's about the history of art, storytelling,
music, animation, programming, level design and all of the other disciplines involved in
making classic game entertainment." Greg Costikyan, New Front inthe Copyright Wars:
Out of Print Computer Games, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2000, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/05/circuits/articles/18aban.html; see also Anthony
Zurcher, 'Abandoned' Games Kept Alive, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2001, at E01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A 12717
-2001Marl5; Brad King, Abandonware: Dead Games Live On, WIRED MAG. (Jan. 19, 2002),
http://www.wired.com/gaming/gamingreviews/news/2002/01/49723.
202. See Reese, supra note 196, at 636.
203. For example, the recent discovery of dozens of American silent films that were
once thought lost in Russia received widespread media attention. See Peter Finn, Silent
Films Recovered: These New Releases Are Oldest in A Long Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 8,
2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/silent-films-recovered-these-newreleases-are-oldest-in-a-long-time/2011/02/08/ABhyVuQstory.html; Kelly Marshall Smoot,
'Lost' Silent Movies Found in Russia, Returned to US, CNN.coM (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-21/entertainmentlus.russia.found.films_1_silent-films-filmpreservation-digital-preservation?_s=PM:SHOWBIZ.
204. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2006). "For purposes of this subsection, a format shall be
considered obsolete if the machine or device necessary to render perceptible a work stored in
that format is no longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in the commercial
marketplace." Id. Before making archival copies, the library must use "reasonable effort" to
determine "that an unused replacement copy can't be obtained at a fair price." Id.After the
copy is made, the library must ensure than any copy "reproduced in digital format is not
made available to the public in that format outside the premises of the library ...... Id.
205. Examples include King's Quest, original or older versions of Paperboy, Pac-Man,
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retro trendiness or collectability ....It's about the history of art,
storytelling, music, animation, programming, level design and all of the
other disciplines involved in making classic game entertainment. ' '2 6
A digital first sale doctrine would not only facilitate the alienation of
property and lower transaction costs of conveying digital works. It would
also give copy owners the flexibility to maintain and reconvey older works
that might otherwise become lost or unusable, creating an additional benefit
to the public.
2. Conditional Sales of Patented Goods
In patent law, courts have allowed restrictions on the rights of the
purchaser of a chattel that "embodies patented ideas even when the chattel
is sold if notice is given of the restrictions, such restrictions are within the
scope of the patent grant, and the patent rights have not yet been
exhausted." 2 7
As Blackstone worried, complex ownership rules for chattels "would
20
occasion perpetual suits and quarrels... [if] tolerated and allowed., 1
Parties seeking to purchase and interact with conditionally sold goods

SimCity, Where in the World is Carmen San Diego?, and Oregon Trail. A note on the
Abandonia website captures the challenges of archiving. In reference to a game called the
Lost City of Atlantis, a poster writes,
This is a really obscure game that took me 11 years to get my hands on! As a kid I
played the demo which came with an issue of "PC Format" in 1996. Ever since
then I tried to find it. There was no trace of it on the internet, and I was really
starting to fear the game was lost forever. After countless searches and postings on
different forums over the years I learned that the game's title was "The Lost City
of Atlantis"... and also that it was made by American developer "Noch
[S]oftware, [I]nc[.]" back in [19]95. That didn't help much since Noch was dead,
but later still I finally got a hold of a demo through a German Abandonia member
(demo was in English), and a month later he had also managed to obtain a German
full version! Later still I came in contact with the actual producer of the game,
Thomas Dumstorf, through an old fax number, and he told me that even he had no
idea where to find the English version!
The Lost City of Atlantis, ABANDONIA, http://www.abandonia.com/en/games/1066
/Lost+City+of+Atlantis%2C+The.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
206. Costikyan, supra note 201.
207. Winston, supra note 91, at 108; see also B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124
F.3d 1419, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that patent exhaustion "does not apply to an
expressly conditional sale or license"); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. MediPart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700,
709 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that a patentee could prevent reuse of a patented device if the
device was labeled for a single use).
208. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *398.
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would have to expend effort to learn the scope of their rights in the goods.
Moreover, the existence of conditional sales of patented goods increases the
measurement costs associated with other personal property, as the purchaser
of many goods would be wise to inquire about whether a particular item
was patented and had been subject to a conditional sale. The social costs
imposed by conditional sales suggest that the practice of selling patented
goods might also benefit from the standardization of the numerus clausus
principle and that a system permitting only unconditional sales may be
preferable to the status quo.
At the moment, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court's decision in
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.209 eliminated or restricted
conditional sales. Prior to Quanta, conditional sales were seen by the
Federal Circuit as only a partial conveyance of the rights in sold patented
goods.21 0 As a result, since a seller can only convey as good of title as he
possesses, downstream purchasers were also subject to the conditions of the
original sale.211 Acting outside of the limited grant to use or convey the
patented good constituted patent infringement, and
212 patentees could sue for
both patent infringement and breach of contract.
But in Quanta, the Supreme Court may have reconceived conditional
sales to be a matter of contract rather than property. 3 In Quanta,computer
manufacturers purchased products from Intel that were designed to practice
patents owned by LGE. 2 1' The defendant manufacturers, including Quanta,
were informed that they could not combine the Intel products with non-Intel
products, pursuant to an agreement between LGE and Intel.215 However, the
agreement between LGE and Intel provided that "[n]otwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the parties agree that
nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion
that would otherwise apply when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed
Products. '21 6 The Court held that Intel's sales to manufacturers had
exhausted LGE's interest in the products.2t 7 Although the Court did not
explicitly consider whether the products had been sold subject to
conditions, it did note, "the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not
necessarily limit LGE's other contract rights. LGE's complaint does not
include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on whether

209. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
210. Hovenkamp, supra note 81, at 502.
211. Id.
212. See B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426 ("[Violation of valid conditions
entitles the patentee to a remedy for either patent infringement or breach of contract.").
213. See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2007).
214. Id.at 621-24.
215. Id. at623-24.

216. Id. at 623 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
217. Id. at637.
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contract damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to
eliminate patent damages. 2 ms
Commentators have interpreted Quanta in a variety of ways. Many
believe that it leaves the conditional sale doctrine largely intact, given that
the Supreme Court did not directly address the matter.219 Shubha Ghosh
suggests that the conditional sale doctrine could now apply only to "use
220
restrictions placed on the direct purchaser of a patented invention.,
Christopher Holman interprets Quanta as implicitly overruling the
conditional sale doctrine. 221 And Herbert Hovenkamp similarly concludes
that Quanta "restored the first sale rule to its original broad scope .... This
means that the conditions can be enforced only by breach of contracts suits,
not by infringement suits, and only against persons who are in privity with
respect to the contract that is being enforced.22
Disputes about the meaning of Quanta may be resolved by the Supreme
Court in the upcoming case Bowman v. Monsanto Co., which concerns the
validity of the conditional sale doctrine, among other issues.223 A ruling that
eliminates the conditional sale doctrine entirely would lower the
measurement costs associated with purchasing potentially patented goods
and significantly benefit the public.

218.

Id. at 637 n.7.

219.

Erin Julia Daida Austin, Reconciling the Patent Exhaustion and ConditionalSale

Doctrines in Light of Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 2947, 297374 (2009); William LaFuze, Justin Chen, & Lavonne Burke, The Conditional Sale Doctrine
in a Post-Quanta World and Its Implications on Modern Licensing Agreements, 11 J.
MARSHALL REv. INTELL. PROP. L. 295, 315-16 (2011); David McGowan, Reading Quanta
Narrowly, PATENTLY-O (July 27, 2008, 3:17 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com
patent/2008/07/reading-quanta.html.
220. Shubha Ghosh, The Quandary of Quanta: Thoughts on the Supreme Court
Decision One Week Later, ANTrIRUST & COMPETITION PoucY BLOG (June 17, 2008),

http://lawprofessors.typepad.con/antitrustprof blog/2008/06/the-quandry-of.html.
221. Christopher Holman, Quanta and Its Impact on Biotechnology, HOLMAN'S
BIOTECH IP BLoG (June 11, 2008, 2:57 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.
blogspot.con/2008/06/quanta-and-its-impact-on-biotechnology.html.
222. Hovenkamp, supranote 81, at 502-03.
223. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (Mem.) (2012); Dennis Crouch,
Self-Replicating (And Alive) Inventions: Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Monsanto v.
Bowman, Patently-O (Oct. 5, 2012), http:llwww.patentlyo.com/patent2Ol2/10/selfreplicating-and-alive-inventions-supreme-court-grants-certiorari-in-monsanto-vbowman.html.

MULLIGAN

20131

VII. POTENTIAL CONCERNS

A. Frustratingthe Intent ofParties
A 1984 New York case, Garner v. Gerrish, dealt with a "lease-forlife." 224 Because tenancies may only be for a term of years, at will, periodic,
or at sufferance, 225 the court was left with a dilemma---either regard the
a
lease as a tenancy at will or a life estate, neither of which it was, or create227
226
application
new form of tenancy. The opinion criticized the "harsh
and "antiquated notion[s] '' 228 of the numerus clausus principle. Treating the
lease as a tenancy at will would "violate[] the terms of the agreement and
frustrate[] the intent of the parties. ' 229 The court equivocated in its
conclusion, characterizing the lease as a "life tenancy terminable at the will
of the tenant"23 -- effectively a life estate-while continually characterizing
the interest as a lease.231
Garnerv. Gerrishillustrates a real problem with numerus clausus-that
its application can frustrate the manifest intent of agreeing parties. Merrill
and Smith acknowledge that
any attempt to venture beyond the simple sales of goods and short-term
leases into the arcane worlds of future interests, easements and covenants,
In this sense,
or intellectual property requires the advice of a lawyer ....
the numerus clausus discriminates in favor of those who are well-endowed
with legal resources and against those who are poorly endowed.232
In the context of intellectual property, the notion that "unsophisticated
or poorly advised actors" 233 may be at a disadvantage is as applicable to the
current numerus infinitus system of shrink-wrap and click-wrap licensing.
Even the "simple sale[] of goods'234--or rather licensing of software,
music, and eBooks-requires agreeing to a contract that few have the time
to read or capability to understand. If some fear that the numerus clausus is

Gamer v. Gerrish, 473 N.E.2d 223,223 (N.Y. 1984).
See 2 POWELL, supra note 8, §§ 16.03-.06, at 16-43 to 16-81; ROBERT S.
SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 2:1-:26, at 30-83 (1980); 4
224.
225.

THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 39.02(c), at 492 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).

226.
227.
228.
229.

See Garner,473 N.E.2d at 224.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 22.
Garner,473 N.E.2d at 224.
Id.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 225.
Id.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 7.
Id.
Id.
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a "trap for the unwary, ' 235 surely the current reign of "terms of use" is
equally entrapping.
Because one party-the customer--does not negotiate the content of
terms of use or even know what they say, it is often inaccurate to
characterize the customer's intent as being instantiated in the terms of
service or to claim that the numerus clausus principle would frustrate the
intent of the customer. At best, we only know that the customer preferred to
accede to the terms of service rather than reject the intellectual property
license completely. But that does not tell us whether the customer would
rather pay more for more usage rights, or pay less for fewer, nor does it
reveal whether the seller would be willing to sell other packages of rights
for any particular price. Simply put, we do not know whether a customer's
intent is frustrated when the only signal of his intent is acquiescence to a
contract of adhesion that is too long to read and comprehend.
Beyond the case of click-wrap and shrink-wrap licenses and other
contracts of adhesion, however, it is true that the imposition of a numerus
clausus principle onto intellectual property law would create frustration
costs. The important question is whether those costs are outweighed by the
benefits. Depending on many factors, the answer to this question can and
will change. As a result, aspects of the numerus clausus principle should be
incorporated into the law gradually, and courts and legislatures should be
sensitive to the repercussions of any changes.
B. Loss of Third-DegreePriceDiscrimination
One consequence of requiring copies to be alienable is that third-degree
price discrimination 236 among buyers of copies or patented goods becomes
more difficult. For example, a digital first sale doctrine might prevent
companies like Microsoft from charging different amounts to commercial
and non-commercial users of its software. Purchasers of less-expensive
"Home and Student Editions" of Microsoft Office would be able to sell

235.

Id.

236. Economists differentiate among three types of price discrimination. First degree
price discrimination requires a firm to "gather[] information about individual buyers and
attempt[] to charge each one the most that he or she is able and willing to pay for the good or
service in question." William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of

Information?, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1, 4 (2007). "In second-degree price discrimination, the
seller does not know how much buyers are able and willing to pay, but induces them to
reveal their resources or preferences through their purchasing decisions. Among the
techniques of this sort are volume discounts.. .. " Id.Third-degree price discrimination
describes a situation where "the seller does not know the purchasing power of individual
buyers, but is able to separate them into groups that correspond roughly to their wealth or
eagerness. Classic examples are student and senior discounts." Id.
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their copies to commercial entities for more than they paid, but less than
commercial entities are asked to pay for business editions of office
software. Some might worry that the inability to price discriminate in this
manner would cause intellectual property owners to only sell copies to
higher-valued users.
Depending on many factors, such as "the character of the criteria used
to divide.., groups, its transparency, and public attitudes," a company's
abilit to price discriminate is sometimes socially beneficial, and sometimes
not. 23 Notably, disallowing price discrimination can prevent low-value
buyers from accessing works. For example, suppose there were 100 noncommercial users who would buy Microsoft Office for up to $100, and one
commercial user who would buy Microsoft Office for up to $1,000. If noncommercial users were permitted to resell their copies to commercial users,
Microsoft would profit most by selling Office for $100 because it would
earn $100 from all 100 non-commercial users and from the one commercial
user. On the other hand, if there were 20 non-commercial users and 10
commercial users, Microsoft would profit most from selling Office at
$1,000, earning a total of $10,000 from each of the commercial buyers,
even though they would be charging more than non-commercial buyers
would pay.238 This second scenario would have the unfortunate effect of
leaving non-commercial users unable to acquire copies of Office.
Although the second scenario will occasionally occur, those harms
must be balanced against the other benefits of a first sale doctrine and the
frequency that users find themselves in the first scenario instead. More
importantly, however, is the observation that existing price discrimination
models rest on some faulty assumptions about how resale affects the
intellectual property market. Changing these assumptions suggests that a
world with a first sale doctrine may improve the welfare of both intellectual
property buyers and sellers.
First, it is important to note that while intellectual property holders have
a monopoly on their particular works, intellectual works can and do
compete with each other. Particularly in the case of software, substitute
software may be available if a person cannot afford a particularly highpriced program. For example, Word, Word Perfect, and Open Office are all
word processing programs. If Microsoft were to choose to market its
products toward higher-paying commercial customers, another purveyor of
word processing software could choose to sell to the unmet market of non-

237. Id. at 37. "[E]conomists since at least Arthur Cecil Pigou have concluded that
third-degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it increases total market output."
Hovenkamp, supra note 81, at 532 (citing ARTHUR CECIL PIou, THE EcoNoMIcs OF
WELFARE 11. 14.13 (4th ed. 1932); Marius Schwartz, Third-DegreePriceDiscriminationand
Output: Generalizinga Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 1259 (1990)).
238. In comparison, charging $100 for copies of Microsoft Office would only yield
$6,000 from all thirty commercial and non-commercial purchasers.

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 80:235

commercial customers and charge them less. The choice among multiple
word processing programs would also drive prices down for all customers,
and a company seeking to profit by charging more to higher-value
commercial customers would need to compete on additional factors, such as
providing better customer service or IT support, or simply by making a
better product. These phenomena indicate that even a world where one
seller aimed sales at a higher-value market, lower-value customers would
still have access to useful software. The allowance of public licenses
particularly contributes to this, as open-source projects licensed under
various public licenses have created many useable, free alternatives to
239
proprietary word processers, photo editing programs, and media players.
Second, although some models indicate that sellers do not benefit from
first sale doctrines (and the corresponding hindrance of price discrimination
due to triage), these models have a false premise. Many models describing
how a market would function with and without price discrimination assume
that there is a single set of potential buyers with fixed valuations for the
product at issue. But in the real world, and especially with media, potential
buyers are limited to those who know about a particular new book, video
game, or song. As a work becomes more well-known, the potential buyers
who would pay for the item become more numerous, and the seller can
profit more because there are more potential buyers of the product.
There are several examples where sharing of copyrighted works drove
sales of the work up. Bestselling author Neil Gaiman reported that sales of
his books increased significantly in Russia after pirated versions of his
novels appeared there.2 "People were discovering me through [my] being
pirated, and then they were going out and buying the real books. And when
a new book would come out in Russia, it would sell more and more
copies. ' 24' As an experiment, Gaiman made his novel American Gods
available as a free download for a month, and "sales of [Gaiman's] books
through independent bookstores... went up the following month [by]
300%.,,242 Nonfiction author David Pogue similarly reported that piracy
seemed to increase sales of his books.24 An iPhone application developer,

239. See, e.g., OPEN OFFICE: THE FREE AND OPEN PRODUCTIVITY SurrE, openoffice.org
(last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (offering word processing, spreadsheet, database, and
presentation software); GIMP: THE GMU IMAGE MANIPULATION PROGRAM,
http://www.gimp.org/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (offering image editing software);
VIDEOLAN: OFFICIAL PAGE FOR VLC MEDIA PLAYER, http://www.videolan.org/vlc/ (last
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Daniel Amitay, reported that massive piracy of his app also resulted in the
doubling of his sales. 244 Greater piracy can increase sales because it also
increases the number of potential buyers-the number of people who know
that the product exists at all.245
Similarly, one could expect that a vibrant, legal resale market for
copyrighted works would also increase the number of potential buyers who
might purchase a work by decreasing the work's obscurity. A greater
number of potential buyers could increase a seller's revenue, even if the
lack of ability to price discriminate decreases the amount a seller could earn
from each buyer individually.
But perhaps the best argument against cultivating price discrimination
among digital works, at the expense of implementing the numerus clausus
principle, is demonstrated by digital works' analog or physical ancestors.
The historic prohibition on servitudes in chattels-including books and
record albums--demonstrates that a copyright owner need not be granted
complete control of a work's use for vibrant, quality artwork to flourish. A
certain amount of sharing and reselling has always been accepted-even
celebrated, as we cheer on libraries and second-hand bookstores for making
materials available to those without significant disposable income.
Whether the benefits of a numerus clausus principle outweigh the
benefits of allowing sellers to price discriminate cannot be solely an
empirical question. Rather, a value-judgment must be made about the
importance of the different qualitative benefits of each regime. On balance,
the diminished ability of sellers to price discriminate should not create
hesitation to embrace aspects of the numerus clausus principle as applied to
intellectual property.
VIII. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR PHYSICAL PROPERTY

Over the past few decades, intellectual property licensing agreements
have become more complex. Digital works have allowed the idea of
copying to merge with usage and paved the way for licenses that finely
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9:39
AM),
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http://
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parse what buyers of intellectual property are allowed to do with their
copies. The copyright term has grown to be so long that any work will
likely have several owners over the copyright's life.
The length of copyright terms means we need to consider long term and
future uses of works. People conveying intellectual property in the present
will discount the problems they create for future users, especially because
future transactions may be so far off in the future. The complexity of
licensing agreements for patented and copyrighted material and the length
of the copyright term suggest the measurement costs created by intellectual
property licenses may outweigh frustration costs and other harms .that
potentially result from the introduction of a numerus clausus principle. As a
result, courts and Congress should consider the potential value of
incorporating the numerus clausus principle into some aspects of
intellectual property law.
But even if no changes are made to intellectual property law, the effects
of the absence of the numerus clausus principle in intellectual property
teach us lessons about property law in general. Recently, a financial firm in
Texas started encumbering property it developed for ninety-nine years such
that each time the property changed hands, one percent of the sale price
would have to be paid to the developer.24 The firm described this attempt
to partially buck the first sale doctrine as being inspired by intellectual
property law.247 Its brochure argues, "[O]ver time sophisticated property
owners began to realize
that 'unbundling' [property] rights increased
248
economic efficiency.

But the lesson from intellectual property law is quite the opposite. Too
much unbundling can dramatically decrease economic efficiency by raising
transaction costs and frustrating an owner's ability to alienate property. It is
not property law that should take lessons from intellectual property law, but
the reverse.
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